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Theresa	May’s	decision	to	call	a	snap	election	threw	up	yet	more	questions	regarding	Britain’s	
withdrawal	from	the	European	Union.	Such	a	time	of	uncertainty	calls	for	timely	academic	
analysis,	and	so	the	Political	Studies	Association	(PSA)	is	delighted	to	have	teamed	up	with	The	
UK	in	a	Changing	Europe	once	again	to	shed	some	light	on	the	Brexit	process.
Following	two	successful	collaborations	in	2016	(Brexit and Beyond and Brexit: Six Months On),	
EU referendum: one year on	examines	the	progress	that	has	been	made	thus	far.
The	PSA	is	committed	not	only	to	studying	but	also	informing	political	decision-making.	In	what	
follows	Professor	Anand	Menon	and	his	colleagues	will	guide	you	through	the	complex	political	
journey	that	is	Brexit	and	consider	how	the	UK’s	withdrawal	from	the	EU	is	likely	to	play	out	
across	a	range	of	policy	areas.
Professor Angelia Wilson
Chair,	Political	Studies	Association
Foreword
Image credits for photographs on the front cover and running header can be found on page 60
Well,	it’s	not	boring	is	it?	Politics	continues	to	surprise	us,	and	all	the	while	the	Article	50	clock	
keeps	ticking.	One	year	on	from	the	EU	referendum,	this	report	is	intended	for	all	those	who	
are	interested	in	what	has	happened	since	the	referendum,	and	how	the	Brexit	process	might	
unfold	in	the	months	and	years	to	come.	
As	ever,	my	thanks	to	all	those	who	contributed	to	this	report.	The	authors	have,	in	some	cases,	
had	to	turn	their	sections	around	extremely	quickly	after	the	general	election.	All	have	had	to	
cope	with	irritating	questions	and	queries	from	me.	I’m	grateful	to	Hannah	Bridges	for	doing	
the	copy	editing	so	quickly	and	thoroughly.	As	ever,	Ben	Miller	played	a	crucial	role	in	getting	
the	report	designed	and	produced,	greatly	assisted	by	Navjyot	Lehl,	while	Phoebe	Couzens	
has	worked	tirelessly	to	keep	The	UK	in	a	Changing	Europe	show	on	the	road.	Finally,	I’d	like	to	
express	particular	thanks	to	Camilla	Macdonald,	who	has	shepherded	this	process	from	the	
start	and	gone	over	all	the	text	assiduously.	I’m	sure	it’s	pure	coincidence	that	she’s	leaving	us	
on	23	June.	
Professor Anand Menon
The	UK	in	a	Changing	Europe
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We	should	have	known	better.	While	it	is	
doubtless	a	useful	exercise	to	track	what	has	
become	of	Brexit	a	year	after	the	referendum	
on	EU	membership,	we	were	naïve	in	expecting	
history	to	stand	still	while	we	completed	the	task.	
As	the	drafts	for	this	publication	were	coming	in,	
the	General	Election	took	place.	And	whilst	the	
outcome	may	change	nothing	at	all	to	do	with	
Brexit,	one	cannot	discount	the	possibility	that	it	
will	change	everything.	
So,	with	that	caveat	firmly	in	mind,	this	collection	
looks	at	what	the	decision	to	leave	the	EU	has	
come	to	mean	one	year	on.	We	cover	everything	
from	public	opinion,	politics,	economics	and	
the	implications	for	the	nations	of	the	United	
Kingdom,	to	a	raft	of	public	policies	ranging	from	
agriculture	to	higher	education.	
Inevitably,	there	is	no	clear	conclusion	that	can	
be	drawn	from	such	a	broad	overview.	However,	
several	things	do	stand	out.	First,	there	is	much	
about	Brexit	that	is	no	clearer	than	it	was	a	
year	ago,	and	much	that	is	less	clear.	Talk	of	a	
referendum	on	Irish	unity	has	come	as	something	
of	a	shock.	Jonathan	Portes	points	out	that	
what	might	originally	have	been	thought	of	as	
relatively	straightforward	issues,	such	as	dealing	
with	the	rights	of	EU	nationals	in	the	UK,	are	in	
fact	fiendishly	complicated.	
As	for	the	politics,	well,	what	do	I	need	to	say?	
Public	opinion	seems	to	be	in	flux,	with	John	
Curtice,	Maria	Sobolewska	and	her	collaborators	
and	Sara	Hobolt	and	her	team	suggesting	not	
only	that	old	class	allegiances	to	particular	parties	
might	be	loosening,	but	that	Brexit	itself	might	
be	becoming	a	new	political	divide,	alongside	
the	traditional	left-right	spectrum.	At	the	same	
time,	a	minority	government	will	have	to	deal	
with	a	parliament	whose	approach	to	Brexit	is	
as	yet	unclear,	and	where	backbench	rebellion,	
as	Phil	Cowley	underlines,	is	all	too	likely	in	
dealing	with	one	of,	it	not	the,	most	complicated	
issue	of	public	policy	of	our	lifetime.	As	for	the	
parliamentary	parties	themselves,	well,	read	Tim	
Bale’s	entertaining	piece.	
All	this	politics	will	take	place	against	the	
backdrop	of	the	British	economy.	As	Swati	
Dhingra	intimates,	the	economy	may	not	be	in	
the	rudest	of	health,	and	a	hard	Brexit	would	
hardly	represent	a	cure.	Equally,	as	Philip	McCann	
and	Raquel	Ortega-Argilés	point	out,	the	ultimate	
impact	of	Brexit	may	well	be	further	complicated	
by	its	unequal	impact	on	different	parts	of	the	
country.	
Meanwhile,	there	is	much	we	will	need	to	know	
rather	rapidly.	How	parliament	will	deal	with	the	
Great	Repeal	Bill	is	one	thing.	A	related	minefield,	
explored	by	Jo	Hunt,	concerns	where	the	powers	
that	are	repatriated	end	up	–	Belfast,	Cardiff	and	
Edinburgh	will	all	have	their	piece	to	say	on	the	
matter.	
Turning	to	more	substantive	issues,	the	kind	of	
agricultural	policy	that	will	replace	the	Common	
Agricultural	Policy	is	something	we	should	start	
worrying	about	sooner	rather	than	later.	So	too	is	
the	need	to	deal	with	the	rights	of	EU	nationals	in	
this	country.
In	contrast	to	the	uncertainty	that	has	
characterised	our	approach,	the	EU,	for	its	part,	
has	sorted	out	its	negotiating	position	and	is	
waiting	for	the	British	government	to	arrive.	For	
all	the	early	hopes	that	clever	diplomacy	might	
divide	the	EU27,	they	have	remained	resolutely	
united	in	their	determination	to	see	the	process	
through	without	weakening	the	EU.	Indeed,	as	
Richard	G	Whitman	points	out,	Brexit	even	seems	
to	have	provided	a	fillip	to	plans	for	some	kind	of	
enhanced	EU	defence	capability.	
Much	has	changed	over	the	course	of	the	last	
year.	But	there	is	evidence	that	not	enough	has	
been	done	to	think	through	both	the	immediate	
process	of	leaving	the	EU	and	the	structures	and	
policies	we	would	like	to	have	in	place	once	we	
have	exited.	Brexit,	in	other	words,	will	pose	a	
challenge	to	our	government,	our	parties,	our	
civil	service	and	all	those	involved	in	the	various	
sectors	where	it	will	hit	home.		
By Anand Menon 
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PART ONE: PUBLIC OPINION
Introduction
The	EU	referendum	was	deeply	disruptive	for	
Britain’s	two	main	political	parties.	Conservative	
MPs	were	deeply	divided	in	their	preference	for	
Leave	or	Remain,	while	Labour	MPs	blamed	their	
leader,	Jeremy	Corbyn,	for	the	Remain	side’s	defeat	
and	mounted	a	challenge	against	him.	Meanwhile,	
a	majority	of	Conservative	supporters	ignored	the	
advice	of	their	Prime	Minister	and	voted	for	Leave,	
while	around	a	third	of	Labour	voters	went	against	
their	party’s	advice	and	backed	Leave	too.	
In	contrast,	few	such	difficulties	faced	the	Liberal	
Democrats	or	UKIP.	Holding	a	referendum	to	
get	out	of	Europe	was	UKIP’s	raison	d’être,	
and	thus	an	issue	on	which	both	the	party’s	
elected	representatives	and	its	supporters	were	
united.	And	while	around	a	quarter	of	Liberal	
Democrat	voters	also	failed	to	follow	their	party’s	
recommendation	to	vote	Remain,	once	the	
referendum	was	over	the	traditionally	pro-EU	
party	was	soon	arguing	there	should	be	a	second	
referendum	after	the	Brexit	negotiations	were	
completed.
Between	them,	these	developments	raised	an	
interesting	question.	Would	the	Conservatives	
and	Labour	lose	support	during	the	course	of	the	
Brexit	process,	as	unhappy	Remain	voters	switched	
to	the	Liberal	Democrats	and	Leave	voters	were	
attracted	by	the	unambiguous	position	of	UKIP.	If	
so,	might	British	politics	be	fractured	yet	further?
The general election
At	first	glance,	the	outcome	of	the	2017	election	
suggests	Brexit	has	had	the	opposite	effect.	
Support	for	UKIP	imploded	to	just	2%,	lower	than	
in	2005	and	2010,	let	alone	2015.	The	level	of	
Liberal	Democrat	support	failed	to	recover	from	
the	8%	to	which	the	party	had	sunk	two	years	ago.	
The	Conservatives	and	Labour	between	them	won	
82%	of	the	votes	cast	across	the	UK	as	a	whole,	
more	than	at	any	election	since	1970.	It	seems	as	
though	Brexit	has	paved	the	way	for	a	return	to	
the	two-party	politics	that	characterised	British	
party	politics	in	the	immediate	post-war	period.	
However,	this	conclusion	is	too	simple.	Brexit	was	
associated	with,	and	was	probably	at	least	a	partial	
cause	of,	a	reshaping	of	the	choice	voters	made	
between	Conservative	and	Labour.
Consider,	first	of	all,	the	trends	in	party	support	
amongst	Remain	and	Leave	voters	during	the	
course	of	the	election	campaign.	In	the	last	four	
polls	conducted	by	ICM	immediately	prior	to	the	
election	being	called,	53%	of	Leave	voters	said	
that	they	intended	to	vote	for	the	Conservatives,	
compared	with	38%	of	Remain	supporters.	
However,	this	gap	widened	during	the	course	
of	the	election	campaign.	In	the	last	four	polls	
ICM	undertook	before	polling	day,	support	for	
the	Conservatives	amongst	Leave	voters	was	five	
points	higher	at	58%,	while	that	amongst	Remain	
voters	had	dropped	five	points	to	33%.	
Support	for	Labour	increased	across	the	course	
of	the	campaign	amongst	both	Remain	and	Leave	
voters.	But,	at	13	points,	the	increase	was	more	
marked	amongst	the	former	than	it	was	the	latter	
(six	points).	As	a	result,	what	before	the	election	
was	a	15-point	difference	between	Remain	and	
Leave	voters	in	the	level	of	support	for	Labour	had	
grown	to	22	points	by	polling	day.
Evidence	that	Remain	and	Leave	Britain	diverged	
in	their	willingness	to	vote	Conservative	or	
Labour	is	also	to	be	found	in	the	pattern	of	the	
election	results.	With	the	exception	of	Scotland,	
the	Conservative	vote	increased	most	in	those	
areas	that	voted	Leave,	while	Labour	made	most	
progress	in	areas	that	backed	Remain.	
Within	England	and	Wales,	Conservative	
support	increased	on	average	by	10	points	in	
constituencies	where,	according	to	estimates	
made	by	Chris	Hanretty	of	the	University	of	East	
Anglia,	Leave	won	over	60%	of	the	vote	in	the	EU	
referendum.	Conversely,	support	fell	on	average	
by	two	points	in	seats	where	the	Leave	vote	was	
less	than	45%.	Labour,	in	contrast,	saw	its	vote	
increase	by	twelve	points	in	seats	where	the	
Leave	vote	was	lowest,	but	by	only	nine	points	in	
those	places	where	it	had	been	highest.
Not	the	least	of	the	reasons	why	the	Conservatives	
gained	ground	most	amongst	Leave	voters	and	in	
places	where	the	Leave	vote	was	highest	last	year	
is	that	the	party	benefitted	most	from	the	collapse	
in	the	UKIP	vote.	According	to	a	poll	conducted	
on	polling	day	by	Lord	Ashcroft,	57%	of	those	who	
voted	UKIP	in	2015	voted	for	the	Conservatives	
this	time,	while	only	18%	switched	to	Labour.	
Equally,	where	in	England	and	Wales	UKIP	secured	
under	7.5%	of	the	vote	in	2015,	Conservative	
support	fell	back	on	average	by	three	points,	while	
in	those	seats	where	UKIP	won	more	than	17.5%,	
the	Conservatives	advanced	by	ten	points.	
The	Conservative	party	is,	of	course,	traditionally	
the	party	of	middle	class	voters.	But	Leave	
voters	were	disproportionately	working	class.	
Consequently,	it	was	amongst	working	class	voters	
and	in	predominantly	working	class	constituencies	
that	the	Conservatives	advanced	most.	According	
to	Lord	Ashcroft’s	polling	data,	Conservative	
support	was	up	twelve	points	amongst	working	
class	“DE”	voters	than	it	was	in	2015,	but	by	only	
four	points	higher	amongst	professional	and	
managerial	“AB”	voters.	Equally,	Conservative	
support	increased	by	nine	points	on	average	in	
the	30%	most	working	class	seats	in	England	and	
Wales,	but	by	only	one	point	in	the	25%	most	
middle	class.	In	short,	the	divergence	between	
Remain	and	Leave	voters	served	to	cut	across	the	
traditional	class	base	of	Britain’s	two-party	system.
What lies ahead?
The	general	election	was,	then,	more	of	a	Brexit	
election	than	immediately	meets	the	eye.	Many	a	
Leave	voter	switched	to	the	Conservatives,	while	
Remain	voters	were	more	inclined	to	back	Labour	
than	their	Leave	counterparts.	As	a	result,	the	
Conservative	party	in	particular	won	over	voters	
it	would	not	normally	be	expected	to	reach.	The	
question	that	now	faces	the	party	is	whether	it	can	
keep	them	as	it	tries	to	negotiate	Brexit	against	the	
backdrop	of	a	hung	parliament,	in	which	there	will	
be	pressure	on	the	Prime	Minister	to	soften	her	
vision	of	what	Brexit	should	mean.
By John Curtice
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PART ONE: PUBLIC OPINION
The	referendum	has	given	rise	to	a	new	form	of	
political	attachment	based	on	the	Leave-Remain	
divide.	A	year	on,	nearly	three	quarters	of	people	
think	of	themselves	as	“Leavers”	(38	per	cent)	or	
“Remainers”	(35	per	cent).	These	groups	are	similar	
in	size	to	the	proportion	of	people	who	identify	
with	political	parties.	It	is	primarily	the	people	who	
voted	Remain	who	have	come	to	identify	strongly	
with	this	perspective	after	the	election.	The	
prospect	of	Brexit	has	made	some	people	more	
committed	to	EU	membership.	A	crucial	question	
for	the	future	of	British	politics	is	whether	these	
new	political	identities	dissipate	over	time	as	
Brexit	becomes	a	reality,	or	persist.	This	is	likely	
to	depend	on	whether,	and	how,	political	parties	
mobilise	this	new	fault	line	in	British	politics.
What do people want from Brexit?
The	negotiations	between	the	British	Government	
and	the	EU	involve	an	array	of	complex	policy	
questions.	The	most	prominent	so	far	has	been	
the	trade-off	between	the	Government	prioritising	
preferential	trade	agreements	with	the	EU	or	
prioritising	control	over	EU	immigration	rates.	
But	there	are	many	other	policy	choices	that	
relate	to	the	“divorce	bill”,	continuing	EU	budget	
contributions	and	access	to	EU	funds,	jurisdiction	
of	the	European	Court	of	Justice,	border	controls	
with	the	Republic	of	Ireland	and	so	on.	These	
questions	did	not	feature	on	the	referendum	
ballot	paper,	nor	are	they	issues	that	many	
people	necessarily	gave	much	thought	to	before	
the	referendum.	However,	it	is	crucial	for	the	
Government	that	the	outcome	of	the	negotiations	
is	perceived	to	be	legitimate	by	the	people.	
Our	research	shows	that,	when	asked	to	choose	
between	outcomes	resembling	what	have	
become	known	as	“soft	Brexit”	and	“hard	Brexit”,	
a	large	majority	of	the	public	favour	the	latter.	
Perhaps	more	surprisingly,	when	asked	to	choose	
between	the	Government’s	preferred	outcome	
of	hard	Brexit	and	a	“no	deal”	alternative,	there	
is	a	majority	in	favour	of	walking	away	from	the	
table	without	any	kind	of	deal.	In	the	survey	we	
Introduction
The	EU	referendum	was	a	historic	democratic	
exercise	that	has	given	the	British	Government	
a	popular	mandate	for	leaving	the	EU.	Yet,	the	
choice	between	leaving	or	remaining	in	the	
EU	provided	little	in	the	way	of	guidance	as	to	
what	type	of	Brexit	the	public	wanted.	As	the	
Government	starts	to	negotiate	the	UK’s	exit	from	
the	EU,	we	asked	whether	the	public	remains	
divided	and	what	people	actually	want	from	Brexit.	
Our	survey	evidence	shows	that,	while	the	public	
remains	almost	equally	divided	on	whether	leaving	
or	staying	is	a	good	idea,	there	is	an	emerging	
consensus	about	what	Brexit	should	look	like,	and	
there	are	high	levels	of	support	for	a	“hard	Brexit”	
along	the	lines	proposed	by	Theresa	May.
No regrets as the public remains divided
While	many	commentators	speculated	that	voters	
would	change	their	opinion	on	Brexit	after	the	
implications	of	leaving	the	EU	became	clearer,	
public	opinion	surveys	so	far	tell	a	very	different	
story.	In	fact,	very	few	people	have	changed	their	
minds	about	the	way	they	voted.	When	asked	“In	
hindsight,	do	you	think	Britain	was	right	or	wrong	
to	vote	to	leave	the	EU?”,	polls	show	almost	no	
change	since	the	referendum:	people	who	voted	
Remain	continue	to	think	it	was	wrong	to	vote	to	
leave	the	EU,	while	people	who	voted	Leave	think	
it	was	right	(see	figure	above).
Interestingly,	the	continuing	divide	between	those	
who	favour	and	oppose	Brexit	appears	to	have	
given	rise	to	a	set	of	new	political	identities	in	
Britain.	It	is	well	established	that	many	people	feel	
attached	to	a	political	party	and	this	attachment	
shapes	their	attitudes	to	all	sorts	of	things.	The	EU	
referendum,	however,	was	a	highly	unusual	event.	
The	two	main	parties	were	openly	split	over	the	
issue.	The	electorate	was	also	divided:	around	40	
per	cent	of	Conservative	supporters	voted	Remain,	
while	a	third	of	Labour	supporters	voted	Leave.	
conducted	in	late	April	this	year,	each	of	these	
scenarios	was	described	in	detail	–	crucially	
without	the	“soft”,	“hard”	and	“no	deal”	labels	
–	and	people	were	asked	to	make	a	choice	
between	a	series	of	pair-wise	options	of	different	
negotiation	outcomes.	Our	survey	shows	that	
Leavers	are	relatively	united	in	preferring	the	
hardest	version	of	Brexit	when	given	a	choice.	
This	is	driven	primarily	by	a	desire	to	control	
immigration,	to	limit	the	powers	of	the	European	
Court	and	to	avoid	paying	any	sort	of	settlement	
bill	to	the	EU.	In	contrast,	Remainers	are	much	
more	divided:	while	a	small	majority	favours	a	soft	
Brexit	over	a	hard	Brexit,	40	per	cent	prefer	the	
latter.	On	the	whole,	Remainers	and	Leavers	are	
looking	for	many	of	the	same	things	from	Brexit:	
greater	sovereignty,	good	trade	arrangements	and	
no	settlement	bill.	They	differ	over	the	questions	
of	controlling	immigration	and	giving	rights	to	EU	
citizens	resident	in	the	UK.
One	year	on,	the	electorate	remains	divided	on	
whether	a	vote	on	Brexit	was	a	good	or	a	bad	
thing.	However,	those	divisions	are	much	less	
stark	when	we	focus	on	what	citizens	want	from	
Brexit	and	what	they	will	accept.	Theresa	May’s	
hard	Brexit	is	popular	not	only	among	Leavers,	
but	also	among	a	sizable	proportion	of	Remainers.	
Moreover,	when	asked	how	the	Government	is	
handling	the	Brexit	negotiations,	the	percentage	
of	people	who	say	“well”	has	increased	from	
just	20	to	35	per	cent	over	the	last	six	months.	
As	negotiations	with	the	EU	start	in	earnest,	the	
Government	may	also	benefit	from	a	rally	“round	
the	flag”	effect	from	both	Leavers	and	Remainers.	
At	the	same	time,	however,	the	possible	costs	
of	Brexit	will	also	become	more	apparent	as	
the	negotiations	proceed:	these	could	harden	
opposition	among	those	who	continue	to	identify	
themselves	as	Remainers.
By Sara Hobolt, Thomas Leeper and James Tilley
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PART ONE: PUBLIC OPINION
Brexit	as	such.	The	Conservatives,	capitalising	on	
May’s	huge	early	poll	lead	over	Corbyn,	wanted	
a	debate	about	who	could	best	negotiate	Brexit,	
not	the	details	of	the	deal	that	should	be	sought.	
Indeed,	they	wanted	to	avoid	tying	themselves	to	
specific	negotiating	objectives.	Labour,	meanwhile,	
sought	to	shift	the	agenda	away	from	Brexit	–	on	
which	their	compromise	position	risked	pleasing	
no	one	–	towards	domestic	policies	that	were	
popular	with	voters.
Brexit’s unknowns
The	result	of	all	this	was	that	an	election	called	
to	clarify	the	Brexit	position	in	fact	did	very	little	
to	advance	public	understanding	or	discussion	
of	the	Brexit	options.	As	the	Director	of	The	UK	
in	a	Changing	Europe,	Anand	Menon,	put	it,	
the	main	party	manifestos	“dance[d]	daintily	
round	the	tricky	issues”	of	Brexit.	Subsequent	
campaign	debates	did	little	to	expose,	let	alone	
fill,	the	gaps.	There	was	little	explicit	thinking	
about	how	to	trade	off	a	general	public	desire	
for	lower	immigration	against	the	preference	for	
maintaining	trade	with	the	EU	(see	the	section	on	
public	attitudes).	There	was	little	debate	about	
whether	the	advantages	of	being	able	to	negotiate	
trade	deals	with	non-EU	countries	outweigh	the	
disadvantages	of	leaving	the	Customs	Union.	The	
Conservatives	brandished	the	idea	that	“no	deal	
is	better	than	a	bad	deal”	as	a	totem,	but	little	
attention	was	given	to	what	“no	deal”	implies.	
Labour	said	free	movement	would	end,	but	also	
said	they	wanted	the	option	of	membership	of	
the	Single	Market	to	remain	open,	implying	free	
movement	might	continue.
The	weakness	of	debate	around	Brexit	is	
longstanding.	During	last	year’s	referendum	
campaign,	both	sides	peddled	misinformation.	
Most	criticism	has,	understandably,	focused	on	the	
inaccuracies	of	the	victors,	such	as	the	infamous	
£350	million	claim	and	the	statements	about	
Turkey’s	future	EU	membership.	But	the	losers	
were	at	it	too:	that	the	Treasury	machine	was	used	
to	promote	highly	misleading	claims	about	both	
This	was	supposed	to	be	the	Brexit	election.	In	her	
Downing	Street	statement	on	18	April	announcing	
her	intention	to	seek	the	dissolution	of	parliament,	
Theresa	May	spoke	of	little	else.	She	suggested	
that,	without	an	early	election,	her	opponents	
would	have	both	the	will	and	the	ability	to	disrupt	
her	efforts	to	negotiate	the	best	possible	Brexit	
deal.	The	vote,	she	hoped,	would	deliver	a	secure	
majority	for	her	favoured	Brexit	plan.
Brexit’s low profile
In	the	end,	however,	Brexit	did	not	dominate.	It	
was	mentioned	on	average	580	times	a	day	in	the	
main	UK-wide	newspapers	in	the	week	following	
May’s	statement.	But	that	fell	below	500	for	the	
following	two	weeks,	then	below	400	for	the	four	
and	a	half	weeks	between	then	and	polling	day,	
dipping	to	just	155	mentions	a	day	in	the	sixth	
week	of	the	campaign,	immediately	following	the	
Manchester	bombing.	When	the	BBC’s	Andrew	
Neil	interviewed	the	prime	minister	on	22	April,	
his	questions	turned	to	Brexit	only	in	the	last	few	
minutes.	Interviewing	Jeremy	Corbyn	four	days	
later,	Neil	asked	nothing	directly	about	Brexit	itself,	
although	he	did	enquire	towards	the	end	about	
immigration.	The	other	main	television	debates	
and	interviews	gave	Brexit	more	attention,	but	still	
it	did	not	dominate.
There	were	at	least	three	reasons	for	this.	One,	as	
suggested,	was	the	unforeseen	and	tragic	eruption	
of	terror	into	the	campaign	caused	by	the	attacks	
in	Manchester	and	London.	This	inevitably	shifted	
the	agenda	towards	the	terrorist	threat.	It	raised	
deep	questions	about	both	Theresa	May’s	record	
on	police	funding	and	Jeremy	Corbyn’s	record	
of	opposition	to	counter-terrorism	legislation	
and	seeming	friendship	with	certain	terrorist	
organisations.
A	second	reason	was	the	spectacular	misfiring	
of	the	Conservative	campaign.	Conservative	
strategists	intended	to	focus	on	one	core	
message:	that	Theresa	May,	not	Jeremy	Corbyn,	
was	the	person	to	provide	the	“strong	and	stable	
leadership”	needed	for	successful	Brexit.	But	the	
Conservative	manifesto	introduced	controversial	
policies	–	most	notably	on	social	care	–	that	
distracted	attention	away	from	that	core	message.	
The	prime	minister’s	forced	U-turn	on	social	
care	undermined	the	credibility	of	the	message.	
Veteran	election	watcher	Sir	David	Butler	tweeted	
that	“In	the	20	general	election	campaigns	I’ve	
followed,	I	can’t	remember	a	U-turn	on	this	scale”.
A	third	reason	–	and	perhaps	the	most	
fundamental	–	was	that	neither	Conservative	nor	
Labour	strategists	ever	wanted	a	debate	about	
the	short-	and	the	long-term	economic	impacts	of	
Brexit	should	be	a	matter	of	major	concern.
Strengthening the public debate
The	question	of	how	public	debate	over	complex	
policy	issues	such	as	Brexit	could	be	improved	is	
important.	In	the	wake	of	the	referendum,	50	MPs	
signed	a	motion	calling	for	the	creation	of	a	body	
that	would	check	the	truthfulness	of	claims	made	
during	campaigns	and	fine	those	who	flouted	its	
rulings.	That,	however,	is	unlikely	to	achieve	much:	
it	is	easy	to	mislead	without	directly	lying.	It	also	
raises	questions	about	free	speech,	while	failing	to	
address	the	problem	that	important	matters	are	
often	simply	given	little	careful	attention.
Another	approach	seeks	to	create	fora	in	which	
members	of	the	public	can	learn	about	and	
discuss	the	issues	in	depth.	One	version	of	this	
is	a	citizens’	assembly:	a	gathering	of	randomly	
selected	citizens	who	reflect	the	diversity	of	the	
population	at	large.	They	meet	to	learn	about,	
deliberate	upon,	and	deliver	recommendations	
relating	to	the	issues	on	their	agenda.	As	part	of	
The	UK	in	the	Changing	Europe,	I	am	leading	a	
team	that	will	run	a	Citizens’	Assembly	on	Brexit	
in	the	autumn.	Its	recommendations	will	be	
published	in	a	report	and	put	to	parliament.
A	better	quality	public	discussion	now	would	
strengthen	the	Brexit	process.	It	would	encourage	
politicians	to	focus	on	real,	hard	choices	rather	
than	sloganeering.	It	could	ready	public	opinion	
for	the	kind	of	deal	we	are	likely	to	get,	rather	
than	the	deal	we	might	dream	of.		It	would	help	
negotiators	understand	the	kind	of	trade-offs	
that	are	most	likely	to	engender	public	support.	
Without	this,	a	debate	driven	by	rhetoric	risks	
cornering	our	leaders	into	accepting	an	outcome	
that	harms	us	all.	
By Alan Renwick
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Introduction
One	of	the	most	striking	developments	in	the	House	
of	Commons	over	the	last	50	years	has	been	the	rise	
of	backbench	dissent.	MPs	are	increasingly	willing	
to	vote	against	their	party	line.	This	was,	at	least	
in	part,	the	justification	for	the	calling	of	the	2017	
general	election.	Whilst	the	claim	that	extra	support	
for	the	Conservatives	would	strengthen	Theresa	
May’s	bargaining	power	with	other	European	leaders	
may	have	been	dubious,	there	was	more	credibility	
behind	the	idea	that	it	would	be	easier	to	get	all	the	
Brexit	legislation	through	Parliament	with	a	larger	
Commons	majority.	May	had	inherited	a	slender	
Commons	majority	from	David	Cameron,	which,	
when	she	called	the	election,	stood	at	just	17.	In	
the	House	of	Lords	–	which	has	been	a	permanently	
hung	chamber	since	1999	and	has	been	increasingly	
willing	to	defy	the	government	–	she	had	no	majority	
at	all.	A	larger	Commons	majority	would	have	given	
her	more	room	for	manoeuvre	with	her	own	MPs,	
and	some	more	power	with	the	Lords.	To	repeat	a	
remark	made	by	David	Cameron	at	7am	on	23	June	
2016:	“Well,	that	didn’t	go	according	to	plan”.
What makes for a rebellion?
Indeed,	it	is	probably	worse	than	it	looks	on	paper.	
Here	are	eight	factors	that	help	party	managers	get	
legislation	through	the	House	of	Commons:
• Attitudinal cohesion.	MPs	do	not	rebel	for	the	
sake	of	it.	There	has	to	be	a	disagreement	on	
the	issue	for	rebellion	to	be	considered.	
• A large majority.	Although	large	majorities	
are	not	unambiguously	positive	(they	bring	
with	them	their	own	problems	of	party	
management),	they	do	at	least	provide	a	buffer	
against	rebellious	MPs	within	a	government’s	
own	party.
• Delivery of a manifesto pledge.	Knowing	that	
they	are	elected	mostly	because	of	their	party	
label,	and	not	because	of	their	own	wonderful	
personality,	MPs	are	more	restrained	in	rebelling	
if	an	item	of	policy	has	been	clearly	set	out	in	
their	party’s	manifesto.	
• A first-term government.	Discontent	builds	
up	over	time	within	a	governing	party,	so	
governments	born	out	of	a	period	in	opposition	
usually	see	lower	levels	of	rebellion	than	those	
that	have	been	returned	for	multiple	terms.	
• Prime ministerial coattails.	MPs	who	feel	they	
owe	their	victory	to	the	prime	minister	can	
often	be	persuaded	to	show	loyalty	in	return	
(“she	got	you	here”).	
• A large cohort of new MPs.	The	“coattails	
effect”	applies	especially	to	new	MPs	swept	in	
on	a	wave	of	support	for	the	party	at	the	polls;	
and	anyway,	new	MPs	tend	to	be	less	willing	
to	stand	up	to	their	whips,	from	a	mixture	of	
inexperience	and	(in	some	cases)	careerism.
• Low salience issues.	Parliament	deals	with	a	lot	
of	legislation.	On	much	of	it,	MPs	do	not	have	
much	knowledge	or	interest,	and	even	if	they	
do	have	a	view	on	some	issues,	if	it	is	low	profile	
they	can	often	be	persuaded	to	stick	to	the	
party	line	provided	it	is	not	something	they	feel	
very	strongly	about.	
• Threat of an election/resignation.	A	nuclear	
option,	to	be	deployed	only	sparingly,	prime	
ministers	have	threatened	to	make	votes	on	
legislation	a	vote	of	confidence	–	meaning	
that	a	defeat	on	a	vote	would	trigger	a	general	
election.	This	was	a	tactic	John	Major,	for	
example,	used	on	occasion	in	the	1990s.
What lies ahead?
Of	these	eight	factors,	none	apply	now.	There	
is	no	majority.	There	are	only	a	handful	of	new	
Conservative	MPs.	No	MPs	–	old	or	new	–	are	
thanking	the	prime	minister	for	her	magnificent	
election	campaign.	The	Conservatives	have	been	in	
government	for	seven	years	now,	either	alone	or	in	
coalition,	and	the	habit	of	rebellion	has	built	up	on	
the	backbenches.	Whatever	else	it	is,	Brexit	is	not	
a	low	salience	issue,	and	whilst	the	fundamentals	
of	Brexit	were	sketched	out	in	the	manifesto,	much	
of	the	detail	that	Parliament	will	have	to	vote	on	
over	the	coming	years	was	absent.	This	last	factor	
would	have	caused	a	problem	in	the	House	of	
Lords	in	particular,	even	if	the	Conservatives	had	
won	the	election.	
By	requiring	specifically	worded	motions	for	
the	triggering	of	early	election,	the	Fixed	Term	
Parliaments	Act	removes	the	ability	of	a	prime	
minister	to	link	the	triggering	of	an	election	to	the	
passage	of	specific	pieces	of	legislation.	Theresa	May	
can	still	threaten	to	resign	as	prime	minister	if	she	
does	not	get	her	way,	of	course,	but	this	is	unlikely	to	
have	quite	the	leverage	it	once	might	have	done.	
In	terms	of	attitudes,	we	know	relatively	little	about	
incoming	MPs,	and	it	is,	anyway,	always	best	to	
be	sceptical	about	attempts	to	read	across	from	
stances	taken	before	parliament	to	behaviour	once	
at	Westminster.	But	on	the	Conservative	side	of	
the	House	of	Commons,	at	least,	because	there	
are	so	few	new	MPs,	we	can	draw	on	surveys	from	
before	the	election,	which	show	plenty	of	scope	for	
disagreement.
We	know	that	around	half	of	Conservative	MPs	
voted	Remain,	even	if	most	soon	came	to	terms	
with	the	outcome.	A	survey	of	MPs	conducted	
by	Ipsos	MORI	between	October	and	December	
2016	asked	Conservative	MPs	about	the	trade-
offs	that	may	be	required	in	any	negotiations	(see	
figure).	The	plurality	response	of	Conservative	
MPs	is	in	the	top	right-hand	corner	of	the	graph	–	
prioritising	both	controlling	immigration	and	not	
paying	money	into	the	EU	budget	over	access	to	
the	single	market	–	but	with	significant	minorities	
who	took	a	different	stance.
The	same	survey	found	that	a	full	quarter	of	
Conservative	MPs	believed	that	it	would	not	be	
honouring	the	referendum	result	if	the	UK	ended	
up	staying	in	the	single	market	after	the	Brexit	
negotiations;	just	over	a	third	said	it	would	be	
impossible	to	say	it	was	honouring	the	vote	if	the	
UK	still	paid	into	the	EU	budget.	Almost	60%	said	
that	they	would	not	see	it	as	honouring	the	terms	
of	the	referendum	if	immigration	from	within	the	
EU	could	not	be	controlled.	
Passing	the	detailed	Brexit	legislation	through	
parliament	was	already	a	hard	enough	task	before	
the	election;	by	the	morning	of	9	June,	it	had	got	a	
lot harder.
By Philip Cowley
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Introduction
As	far	as	the	UK’s	political	parties	were	concerned,	
last	summer’s	EU	referendum	was	a	bit	like	one	of	
those	tag-team	wrestling	matches	you	see	on	TV.	
Although	the	bout	began	with	everyone	thinking	
they	knew	who	was	on	which	side,	by	the	end	of	
it	no-one	in	the	ring	–	nor,	for	that	matter,	in	the	
audience	–	was	sure	anymore.
Everyone	knew,	of	course,	that	the	Conservative	
Party	was	divided	on	the	issue.	But	it	wasn’t	until	
the	bell	went	and	the	seconds	stepped	out	of	
the	ring	that	we	(or	indeed	he)	knew	that	David	
Cameron	was	going	to	be	fighting	not	only	Nigel	
Farage	but	also	Boris	Johnson	and	Michael	Gove.
And	while	no-one	expected	Jeremy	Corbyn	to	get	
into	the	ring	at	the	same	time	as	David	Cameron,	
most	people	had	assumed	he’d	do	his	bit.	
Instead,	he	spent	most	of	the	bout	in	the	dressing	
room	–	a	decision	which	allowed	grapple-fan	
favourites	like	Kate	Hoey	and	Gisela	Stuart	to	
give	the	distinct,	but	misleading,	impression	that	
Labour’s	MPs	were	as	divided	on	whether	to	
leave	or	remain	as	their	Tory	counterparts.
True,	the	country’s	smaller	parties	managed	to	
hold	things	together	all	the	way	through	to	the	
end.	No-one	could	doubt,	for	instance,	whose	side	
UKIP	(which,	as	usual,	forearm	smashed	above	its	
weight	media-wise)	was	on.	The	same	could	be	
said	for	the	Lib	Dems,	the	SNP	and	the	Greens.	
And,	although	no-one	was	paying	anywhere	near	
as	much	attention	as	they	should	have	been,	both	
the	DUP	(pro-Brexit)	and	Sinn	Fein	(anti)	behaved	
entirely	as	predicted.
From referendum to election
After	the	referendum,	things	seemed	to	become	
a	little	clearer	–	at	least	on	the	Tory	side.	The	
Remainers	either	retired	hurt	(David	Cameron	
and	George	Osborne)	or	else	acted	as	if	they’d	
always	been	Leavers	(Theresa	May	and	virtually	
everyone	else)	–	not	only	to	the	extent	of	insisting	
on	a	so-called	hard	Brexit	but	even	talking	about	
“no	deal	being	better	than	a	bad	deal.”	A	handful	
of	Europhiles	(kudos,	Anna	Soubry	and	Nicky	
Morgan)	refused	to	drink	the	Kool-Aid	but	they	
were	cast	into	outer-darkness	(and	booted	off	the	
frontbench)	as	“Remoaners”,	replaced	by	veteran	
Europhobes	like	Liam	Fox	and	David	Davis.
Labour,	however,	found	it	much	harder	to	pull	off	
the	collective	amnesia	trick.	Jeremy	Corbyn’s	AWOL	
act	during	the	referendum	campaign	made	his	critics	
in	the	Parliamentary	Labour	Party	even	angrier	with	
him	than	they	already	were.	Interestingly,	however,	
he	seemed	to	escape	any	censure	whatsoever	
from	his	youthful	fan-base	outside	Westminster,	
even	though	many	of	them	were	furious	that	the	
UK	had	voted	to	leave	the	EU	and	therefore	might	
reasonably	have	wondered	if	their	hero	could	have	
done	more	to	avoid	that	outcome.
Had	Labour	MPs	not	lost	their	heads	and	triggered	
a	premature	leadership	contest,	perhaps	things	
would	have	been	different.	But	they	did,	thereby	
ensuring	that	any	of	Corbyn’s	extra-parliamentary	
army	who	shared	their	suspicions	that	he	(and	his	
Shadow	Chancellor	John	McDonnell)	had	secretly	
wanted	Brexit	all	along	promptly	forgot	all	about	
their	reservations	in	the	rush	to	defend	“Jeremy”	
against	“the	chicken	coup”.
With	Corbyn	re-elected,	Labour	MPs	found	
themselves	being	asked	to	go	against	everything	
almost	all	of	them	had	ever	stood	for	by	voting	
in	favour	of	the	government	triggering	Article	
50,	thereby	setting	the	clock	ticking	on	the	UK’s	
departure	from	the	EU.	Most	of	them	managed	
to	swallow	their	objections	and	their	pride,	
reasoning	that	it	was	the	only	way	of	reconciling	
the	difference	between	their	views	and	the	
significant	support	for	Leave	in	many	Labour-held	
constituencies	that	looked	vulnerable	either	to	
UKIP	or	to	the	Conservatives	as	a	result.	That	said,	
nearly	50	MPs	voted	with	their	consciences	and	
in	many	cases	(and	surely	not	coincidentally)	with	
their	largely	Remain-supporting	constituents.	
In	the	wake	of	Article	50,	Labour’s	position	on	
what	it	wanted	out	of	the	Brexit	it	had	just	voted	
for	remained,	to	put	it	mildly,	a	little	unclear.	
Had	it	fully	reconciled	itself	to	rejecting	freedom	
of	movement	and	therefore	leaving	the	Single	
Market?	What	exactly	was	the	have-our-cake-
and-eat-it	solution	that	it	was	proposing	if	it	
wasn’t	“the	Norway	option”?	Would	Labour	MPs	
really	dare	to	vote	down	whatever	deal	(or	no	
deal)	Theresa	May	eventually	agreed	with	the	EU	
in	two	years’	time?	No-one,	not	even	Labour’s	
spokesman	on	the	issue,	Keir	Starmer,	seemed	to	
know	for	sure.
The election
All	this	confusion,	the	Lib	Dems	hoped,	would	
see	their	fortunes	revive	as	the	standard-bearer	
for	“the	48%”.	But	their	prayers	proved	to	be	in	
vain	as	the	bulk	of	Remain	voters,	even	those	
who	continued	to	hope	Brexit	could	be	avoided,	
seemed	destined,	at	elections	anyway,	to	stick	with	
the	devils	they	knew	rather	than	throw	their	lot	in	
with	Tim	Farron.
Brexit’s	biggest	loser,	however,	was	obviously	UKIP.	
Farage,	who	stepped	down	to	spend	less	time	with	
his	family	and	more	time	with	his	new	best	friend,	
Donald	Trump,	proved	predictably	irreplaceable.	
Meanwhile,	Mrs	May	was	offering	his	voters	not	
only	more	Brexit	and	less	immigration,	but	also	
grammar	schools,	a	war	on	wind	turbines,	and	
whole	lot	more	besides.
Little	wonder,	then,	that	she	belatedly	bought	her	
advisors’	arguments	that	she	should	capitalise	on	
the	collapse	of	the	Conservatives’	right-wing	rival	
by	calling	an	early	general	election	–	a	contest	
which,	by	delivering	her	a	bigger	majority,	would,	
paradoxically,	make	her	less	dependent	on	her	
own	Eurosceptic	ultras	at	Westminster.
It	didn’t,	of	course,	turn	out	that	way.	Six	
disastrous	weeks	later,	the	Conservatives	were	
returned	to	Westminster	with	fewer	MPs	and	
no	parliamentary	majority,	stuck,	when	it	comes	
to	Brexit,	between	Scylla	(Tory	“headbangers”	
insisting	on	full-speed	ahead	to	a	Hard	Brexit)	and	
Charybdis	(the	DUP	which	wants	out	of	the	EU	
but	without	a	return	to	a	hard	border	with	the	
South).	Whether,	in	such	rough	seas,	Mrs	May	
or	her	successor	can	keep	the	ship	afloat	for	two	
full	years	of	tough	negotiations	with	the	EU27	is	
anyone’s	guess.
By Tim Bale
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Introduction
The	2017	general	election	was	billed	as	the	“Brexit	
election”.	Set	against	the	backdrop	of	the	2016	
referendum	on	EU	membership,	Prime	Minister	
Theresa	May	framed	the	election	as	a	way	of	
“strengthening	her	hand”	ahead	of	the	negotiations	
with	the	EU	and	ensuring	stability.	But,	in	the	end,	
she	achieved	neither.	
While	the	Conservative	Party	attracted	a	42.4%	share	
of	the	national	vote	–	their	highest	share	since	1979	
and	an	increase	of	more	than	5%	on	their	result	in	
2015	–	the	party	failed	to	increase	its	number	of	seats.	
At	318,	the	Conservatives	won	13	fewer	seats	than	in	
2015	and	were	left	eight	short	of	a	majority.	A	working	
majority	of	17	made	way	for	a	hung	parliament	and	
negotiations	with	the	Democratic	Unionist	Party	
(DUP),	which	if	successful	will	leave	May,	now	a	greatly	
diminished	figure,	with	a	working	majority	of	just	13.
Jeremy	Corbyn’s	Labour,	meanwhile,	had	a	better	
night	than	expected,	polling	40%	of	the	national	
vote	–	their	highest	share	since	2001	and	a	9.5-point	
increase	since	2015	–	and	winning	262	seats,	30	
more	than	in	2015.	
Can	the	election	result	be	attributed	to	a	“Brexit	
effect”?	Initial	reactions	to	the	result	certainly	
focused	on	the	Brexit	realignment.	The	shock	Labour	
win	in	Canterbury	came	to	epitomise	this	–	Labour’s	
vote	increased	over	20	percentage	points	in	this	
traditionally	blue	seat	with	two	university	campuses,	
where	55%	of	voters	were	estimated	to	have	voted	
Remain.	Jeremy	Corbyn	became	the	first	party	leader	
to	take	the	seat	from	the	Conservatives	since	William	
Gladstone.	
The effect of the Brexit referendum on the 2017 vote
Figure	1	illustrates	the	changes	in	English	and	
Welsh	constituencies	by	their	estimated	support	
for	Leave	in	the	2016	EU	referendum,	based	on	
figures	provided	by	Chris	Hanretty.	The	Conservatives	
stagnated	or	fell	back	in	Remain	areas,	gaining	the	
most	ground	in	the	strongest	Brexit	seats,	which	
also	saw	the	biggest	collapse	of	UKIP	support.	This	
fits	with	much	of	the	pre-election	polling	showing	
large-scale	switching	from	UKIP	to	the	Conservatives.	
The	surprise	comes	on	the	Labour	side.	The	party’s	
surge	was	greatest	in	the	strongest	Remain	areas,	but	
Labour	surged	everywhere	else,	too.	Corbyn’s	party	
was	up	by	nearly	13	points	on	2015	in	seats	where	
less	than	35%	voted	Leave;	and	rose	a	still-hefty	7.4	
points	in	seats	where	more	than	65%	did	so.	
This	had	two	important	effects.	Firstly,	the	fall	in	
Conservative	support	combined	with	the	surge	
in	Labour	support	was	sufficient	to	topple	huge	
majorities	in	Conservative-held	Remain	seats,	
particularly	in	London,	where	Labour	overturned	
large	majorities	in	Battersea,	Kensington	and	Enfield	
Southgate,	and	slashed	Conservative	majorities	in	
previously	safe	seats	such	as	Putney	and	the	Cities	of	
London	and	Westminster.	Big	swings	in	Remain	seats	
have	created	a	new	swathe	of	marginal	seats	for	
Labour	to	target	in	the	next	election.	
Secondly,	Labour’s	resilience	in	Leave	areas	thwarted	
Conservative	attempts	to	turn	traditional	working-
class	Labour	heartlands	blue	by	consolidating	UKIP	
support.	The	Conservatives	increased	their	vote	in	
such	areas,	often	dramatically,	and	usually	at	UKIP’s	
expense.	Yet,	Labour	also	bounced	back	in	these	areas,	
so	the	net	Labour	to	Conservative	swing	was	weak	
even	in	the	strongest	Leave	seats.	The	Conservatives	
made	just	six	gains	from	Labour	in	Leave	areas	of	
England	and	Wales.	Most	MPs	representing	heavily	
Leave	seats	such	as	Derby	North,	Bolsover	and	Stoke	
North	held	on	with	reduced	majorities.	
Party strategies 
Theresa	May	expected	her	embrace	of	Brexit	to	
fundamentally	change	the	electoral	map	in	her	
favour,	by	holding	Remain	voting	heartlands	while	
expanding	into	Leave-voting,	Labour	strongholds.	
Instead	the	opposite	occurred:	Labour	held	firm	
in	their	Leave-leaning	seats,	and	achieved	often	
stunning	advances	in	previously	true-blue,	Remain	
seats.	One	possible	reason	is	that	in	the	“Brexit	
election”,	Jeremy	Corbyn’s	position	on	the	EU	was	
better	aligned	with	the	electorate	than	Theresa	
May’s.	May’s	ever	more	strident	and	inflexible	
language	on	Brexit	alarmed	Remain-leaning	voters	
in	traditionally	Conservative	areas	and	put	her	
reputation	as	a	competent	steward	of	negotiations	at	
risk.	She	looked	like	a	leader	determined	to	appease	
the	most	vocal	and	ideological	Brexiteers	at	any	cost.	
Jeremy	Corbyn’s	strategy,	by	contrast,	moved	the	
party	towards	the	mildly	Eurosceptic	centre.	Faced	
with	a	complex	issue	where	his	party’s	traditional	
position	was	a	long	way	from	the	median	voter’s,	
Mr	Corbyn	embraced	the	pro-Brexit	position	of	the	
median	voter,	even	at	the	risk	of	antagonising	the	
strongly	pro-EU	segments	of	the	Labour	coalition,	in	
a	move	reminiscent	of	an	earlier	Labour	leader’s.	In	
1997,	Tony	Blair	gambled	that	he	could	pitch	to	the	
centre	ground	on	economic	issues	while	retaining	
the	loyalties	of	working-class	left	wingers.	On	Brexit,	
Jeremy	Corbyn	pitched	to	the	Eurosceptic	centre	
ground	by	invoking	Article	50	and	accepting	the	end	
of	freedom	of	movement,	gambling	that	Remain	
voters	alarmed	by	Theresa	May’s	shrill	rhetoric	and	
hard	Brexit	policy	would	recognise	that	Labour	was	
the	only	viable	alternative.	This	Brexit	Blairism	helped	
blunt	the	Conservatives’	appeal	in	Leave	areas,	while	
allowing	Labour	to	capitalise	on	alarm	with	Theresa	
May’s	Nigel	Farage	tribute	act	in	Remain	areas.	
Conclusion
Of	course,	Brexit	was	not	the	only	factor	driving	the	
results.	Leave	and	Remain	voting	patterns	capture	
a	range	of	other	fundamental	differences	between	
people	and	places:	in	identity	attachments,	social	
class,	education	levels,	ethnic	diversity	and	views	of	
immigration,	among	others.	
Yet	this	may	be	another	reason	Brexit	Blairism	proved	
a	smart	strategy.	Labour’s	decision	to	embrace	
departure	from	the	EU	in	some	form	may	have	
helped	them	reframe	the	election	around	other	
issues	such	as	austerity	and	public	services,	and	
remind	voters	in	Leave	areas	of	their	traditional	
suspicions	about	the	Conservatives.	Meanwhile	in	
Remain	areas,	the	party	could	advance	by	promising	
a	“softer”	alternative	approach	to	“hard”	Brexit.	
The	Conservatives	went	into	this	election	eager	to	
paint	Labour	as	out	of	touch	and	extreme,	but	failed	
to	realise	that,	in	their	own	heartlands,	they	were	
vulnerable	to	the	same	charge.
By Robert Ford, Matthew Goodwin  
and Maria Sobolewska
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Introduction 
In	the	year	since	the	EU	referendum,	the	key	
question	that	has	preoccupied	Parliament	is	
how	to	legislate	to	give	effect	to	the	decision	of	
the	British	people	to	leave	the	EU.	The	practical	
question	of	how	Brexit	would	be	delivered,	and	in	
what	time	scale,	was	not	fully	discussed	during	the	
referendum	campaign.	Since	the	referendum,	both	
the	Government	and	Parliament	have	focussed	
on	how	to	leave	the	EU	within	the	two-year	
timetable	prescribed	by	the	Article	50	process,	
while	simultaneously	formulating	a	strategy	to	
address	the	immediate	legal	consequences	for	
the	UK	of	leaving	the	EU.	To	address	this	latter	
point,	the	Government	has	proposed	laying	
before	Parliament	the	Great	Repeal	Bill,	which	will	
convert,	on	the	day	of	withdrawal,	all	existing	EU	
law	into	UK	law.	
To	further	complicate	matters	(not	least	by	
shortening	the	parliamentary	time	available	to	
debate	Brexit)	the	prime	minister	called	a	snap	
general	election	for	8	June	2017.	The	aim	of	
the	Government	in	calling	this	election	was	to	
strengthen	its	majority	and,	arguably,	provide	
it	with	a	stronger	mandate	during	the	Article	
50	negotiations.	However,	the	outcome	of	the	
election,	a	hung	Parliament	with	a	minority	
Conservative	government,	creates	uncertainty	
and	would	appear	to	leave	the	UK	in	much	weaker	
position	at	the	commencement	of	the	Brexit	
negotiations.	By	contrast,	the	outcome	of	a	hung	
Parliament	creates	improved	opportunities	for	
Parliament	to	exercise	control	and	scrutiny	over	
the	Government.
Parliament since the referendum 
The	process	by	which	Article	50	was	formally	
triggered	on	29	March	2017	provides	a	good	
illustration	of	the	parliamentary	challenges	the	
Government	faces	in	delivering	Brexit,	even	if	it	
had	retained	an	overall	parliamentary	majority.	
The	judgment	of	the	Supreme	Court	in	January	
2017	confirmed	that	Parliament,	not	the	
Government,	had	the	sole	power	to	trigger	Article	
50,	thereby	laying	down	an	important	marker	that	
Parliament	cannot	be	bypassed	during	the	course	
of	the	Brexit	negotiations.	One	consequence	of	the	
Supreme	Court	judgment	is	that	it	has	created	an	
expectation	that	Parliament	will	be	engaged	in	the	
Brexit	process,	which,	in	practice,	means	exercising	
effective	scrutiny	over	the	Government	during	the	
Brexit	process.	This	engagement	will	only	increase	
with	a	hung	parliament,	with	the	opposition	likely	
to	identify	opportunities	to	amend	or	even	defeat	
the	Government	on	Brexit	issues	where	there	may	
be	cross-party	support.
Despite	the	Government	making	a	commitment	
before	the	election	that	both	Houses	of	Parliament	
will	vote	on	any	final	Brexit	deal,	it	is	not	totally	
clear	what	this	will	mean	in	practice,	though	
the	hung	Parliament	should	place	limits	on	
the	Government’s	scope	to	bypass	Parliament.	
Specifically,	there	remains	uncertainty	as	to	
whether	Parliament	will	be	able	to	reject	the	
final	outcome	–	whether	a	deal	or	no	deal.	
Furthermore,	before	the	election	the	prime	
minister	consistently	stated	her	unwillingness	to	
provide	a	“running	commentary”	to	Parliament	on	
the	progress	of	the	negotiations.	
Following	the	election	of	a	minority	government,	
it	may	be	argued	that	Parliament	is	in	a	better	
position	to	exert	influence	over	the	Government	
during	the	Brexit	negotiations	both	in	terms	of	
scrutiny	and	with	respect	to	the	substance	of	the	
negotiations.	The	absence	of	a	parliamentary	
majority	is	likely	to	make	it	difficult	for	the	
Government	to	conduct	negotiations	without	
reference	to	MPs,	especially	by	not	offering	
a	“meaningful	vote”	on	the	outcome	of	the	
negotiations	which,	with	a	minority	government,	it	
remains	possible	that	Parliament	could	reject.
The parliamentary challenge of delivering Brexit 
– democracy versus efficiency
Perhaps	the	biggest	challenge	facing	the	
newly	elected	Parliament	will	be	a	legislative	
one.	To	deliver	Brexit,	Parliament	will	need	to	
pass	a	number	of	important	bills	(upwards	of	
10),	including	the	Great	Repeal	Bill	(see	the	
Great	Repeal	Bill	section	on	this)	before	the	
completion	of	the	Article	50	negotiations.	This	
will	prove	challenging	given	limited	parliamentary	
time.	The	time	available	consists	of	only	two	
full	parliamentary	sessions,	during	which	
parliamentarians	will	need	to	continue	with	
the	wider	legislative	programme.	However,	it	
is	the	absence	of	a	working	majority	that	will	
undoubtedly	make	it	more	difficult	to	secure	
parliamentary	approval	for	key	Brexit	legislation,	
such	as	the	Great	Repeal	Bill.	
Delivering	Brexit	within	the	timescale	prescribed	
by	Article	50	will	place	immense	pressure	
upon	Parliament.	Effective	management	of	
parliamentary	time	will	be	an	important	tactic	
that	is	likely	to	be	employed	by	the	Government,	
not	least	as	a	way	of	limiting	debate	and	scrutiny.	
It	is	therefore	crucial	that	Parliament	uses	the	
opportunity	of	a	hung	Parliament	to	provide	a	
strong	counter	balance	to	the	requirement	of	
meeting	the	Article	50	deadline	of	29	March	2019	
by	insisting	that	democratic	accountability	and	
scrutiny,	whether	in	the	chamber	or	via	select	
committees,	is	not	compromised.	
Given	the	legislative	and	political	challenges	of	
delivering	Brexit,	it	is	essential	that	Parliament	and	
the	Government	avoid	conflict	as	far	possible	and	
cooperate	in	order	that	the	objectives	of	Brexit	
and	parliamentary	democracy	are	fully	reconciled.	
In	terms	of	parliamentary	activity,	this	will,	first	
and	foremost,	require	improved	cooperation	
between	Government	and	the	opposition	to	
ensure	that	parliamentary	scrutiny	is	focussed	on	
key	legislative	proposals.	
Post-election,	the	Government	should	present,	
without	delay,	its	legislative	proposals,	especially	
where	new	and	potentially	complex	UK	legislation	
will	be	required	before	Brexit	–	for	example	with	
respect	to	immigration	or	customs	rules	–	which	
cannot	be	adopted	via	the	Great	Repeal	Bill.	To	
ensure	that	this	legislation	is	enacted	within	
the	necessary	timeframe,	and	to	avoid	the	
uncertainty	of	the	so-called	“cliff-edge”,	sufficient	
parliamentary	time	for	scrutiny	of	all	new	
legislation	must	be	built	into	the	Government’s	
legislative	programme.	
Ultimately,	the	success	of	Brexit	will	be	judged	
not	by	the	outcome	of	the	referendum,	but	on	
the	basis	of	how	Parliament	gives	effect	to	the	
referendum	decision.	In	particular,	this	means	
whether	UK	citizens	believe,	in	the	years	to	come,	
that	their	expectations	for	Brexit	have	been	
delivered	by	the	Parliament	they	elected	to	fulfil	
this	task.
By Adam Cygan
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PART THREE: BREXIT AND THE POLITICS OF THE UK
Introduction
Northern	Ireland	voted	to	Remain	and,	one	
year	on,	is	a	society	struggling	with	the	forces	
unleashed	by	the	Brexit	vote.	It	has	exacerbated	
tensions	and	reopened	its	ever-present	
sovereignty	fracture.	
Politics	in	Northern	Ireland	typically	focuses	on	
issues	relating	to	the	divide	between	Catholic	
nationalists	(who	are	favourably	disposed	to	a	
united	Ireland)	and	Protestant	unionists	(who	
prioritise	the	maintenance	of	Northern	Ireland’s	
union	with	the	rest	of	the	UK).	The	recent	
Westminster	election	(June	2017)	confirms	that	
this	remains	the	dominant	dynamic	in	Northern	
Irish	politics.	Northern	Ireland	is	still	a	society	
scarred	by	ethno-national	division	and	the	
consequences	of	conflict.	
Is	Brexit	an	issue	that	cross-cuts	this	divide,	with	
significant	numbers	of	Catholics	and	Protestants	
on	both	sides	of	the	debate?	The	simple	answer	is:	
No. 
In	contrast	to	Britain,	where	both	Conservative-
inclined	voters	and	Labour	supporters	are	
seriously	split	on	the	Brexit	issue,	in	Northern	
Ireland,	Catholic	nationalist	voters	and	parties	are	
overwhelmingly	Remain,	while	Protestant	voters	
and	the	main	unionist	party,	the	Democratic	
Unionist	Party	(DUP),	are	strongly	“Leave”.	
Thus,	the	easiest	way	to	make	sense	of	the	
consequences	of	Brexit	for	Northern	Ireland	is	
to	view	these	through	the	prism	of	the	unionist-
nationalist	distinction.	
The border
What	to	do	about	the	border	is	one	major	
challenge.	Nationalist	parties	in	Northern	Ireland	
(and	Catholic	voters)	firmly	oppose	any	form	of	
“hard	border”	between	Northern	Ireland	and	the	
Republic	of	Ireland.	And	the	unionist	parties	(and	
Protestant	voters)	are	highly	sceptical	of	any	east-
west	alternative,	namely	border	controls	between	
Northern	Ireland	and	the	rest	of	the	UK.	
These	are	highly	sensitive	issues.	If	not	handled	
well,	there	is	potential	for	significant	disquiet,	
either	from	staunch	nationalists	upset	by	any	
physical	manifestation	of	a	north-south	border	or	
from	hard-line	unionists	whose	identity	would	be	
wounded	if	barriers	to	their	smooth	movement	
across	the	UK	were	introduced.	
How	this	border	question	plays	out	has	been	
significantly	affected	by	the	Westminster	election.	
As	is	now	clear,	the	DUP	is	likely	to	enjoy	significant	
post-election	political	leverage	in	Westminster	to	
pursue	an	agenda	of	the	UK	exiting	the	EU,	and	
will	be	in	pole	position	to	shape	the	associated	
border	regime.	
United Ireland?
A	danger	for	the	DUP,	and	for	unionism	in	
general,	is	alienating	the	nationalist	community	
even	further,	to	such	an	extent	that	they	begin	
agitating	in	a	sustained	way	for	a	referendum	
on	a	united	Ireland	to	facilitate	the	“return”	of	
Northern	Ireland	to	the	EU	on	an	all-island	basis.	
The	fact	that	nationalists	in	Northern	Ireland	
have	now	effectively	voted	to	turn	their	backs	on	
Westminster	politics	is	a	clear	warning	of	where	
politics	may	go	in	the	not-too-distant	future.	
The	debate	needs	to	be	normalised.	Demands	
for	a	“border	poll”	should	not	be	seen	as	strange,	
unusual	or	contrary	to	the	constitutional	status	
quo.	The	possibility	of	a	referendum	on	a	united	
Ireland	is	a	core	element	of	the	1998	Good	Friday/
Belfast	Agreement,	which	established	the	current	
political	structures	in	Northern	Ireland.	If	it	is	
obvious	(to	the	Secretary	of	State	for	Northern	
Ireland)	that	there	is	significant	desire	for	such	a	
referendum,	then	such	a	poll	may	be	held.	
With	both	nationalist	parties	now	putting	this	
more	firmly	on	the	agenda,	and	with	the	major	
gains	for	Sinn	Féin	in	the	Westminster	election	
(and	the	elections	to	the	Northern	Ireland	
Assembly	in	March	2017),	the	likelihood	it	will	
occur	has	increased.	If	opinion	poll	evidence	
over	the	coming	months	points	to	a	significant	
proportion	of	Northern	Ireland	citizens	favouring	
unity	with	the	Republic	of	Ireland	(or	clearly	
supporting	the	call	for	a	unity	referendum),	it	
would	be	difficult	to	withstand	the	pressure	to	
advance	this	option.	
Unity	would	also	require	a	referendum	in	the	
Republic	of	Ireland,	and	any	such	debate	would	
grapple	with	the	financial	pros	and	cons	of	unity	
as	well	as	the	symbolic	and	identity-related	
aspects.	As	the	DUP	is	finding	in	its	discussions	
over	cooperation	with	the	Conservative	Party,	
both	communities	in	Northern	Ireland	may	
discover	they	are	not	universally	welcomed	in	their	
respective	sovereign	states.	
Conclusion
While	in	Britain	Brexit	maps	onto	a	set	of	
issues	relating	to	sovereignty,	immigration	and	
globalisation,	Northern	Ireland	is	grappling	with	
an	arguably	bigger	basket	of	thornier	questions	
relating	to	the	place	and	nature	of	the	border,	the	
related	significant	threat	of	civil	disquiet,	and	the	
prospect	of	a	referendum	on	a	united	Ireland.	All	
of	which	would	add	further	complexity	to	the	UK	
constitutional	mix.	
These	challenges	have	to	be	faced	in	the	fragile	
context	of	no	functioning	government	in	Northern	
Ireland	and	an	unstable	Westminster	regime	
depending	on	a	party	representing	one	half	of	
Northern Ireland.
By John Garry and Colin Harvey
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Introduction
Last	June,	Remain	secured	a	62%	vote	share	in	
Scotland,	with	only	38%	of	voters	backing	Leave.	
Support	for	remaining	in	the	EU	was	the	highest	
of	any	nation	or	region	in	the	UK,	with	a	majority	
in	all	32	local	authority	counting	areas	and	almost	
every	demographic.	
But	the	choice	was	not	only	Scotland’s	to	make.	In	
her	speech	to	the	Conservative	Party	Conference	
last	autumn,	Theresa	May	insisted,	“Because	we	
voted	in	the	referendum	as	one	United	Kingdom,	
we	will	negotiate	as	one	United	Kingdom,	and	
we	will	leave	the	European	Union	as	one	United	
Kingdom.	There	is	no	opt-out	from	Brexit.”	By	
contrast,	First	Minister	Nicola	Sturgeon	insisted,	
“we	didn’t	vote	to	leave	–	we	voted	to	remain.	
To	be	told	that	we	have	to	leave,	regardless,	is	
tantamount	to	being	told	that	our	voice	as	a	
nation	doesn’t	matter”.	
Developments since the EU referendum
The	morning	after	the	referendum,	the	first	
minister	announced	her	intention	to	find	a	way	
to	respect	the	wishes	of	the	Scottish	people.	She	
secured	the	backing	of	the	Scottish	Parliament	
to	negotiate	with	the	UK	Government,	EU	
institutions	and	member	states	to	explore	options	
for	keeping	Scotland	in	the	Single	Market.	A	
compromise	proposition	was	set	out	in	the	
Scottish	Government’s	paper,	Scotland’s	Place	in	
Europe.	The	first	priority	was	to	try	to	keep	the	
UK	within	the	European	Economic	Area	(EEA)	
and	the	EU	Customs	Union.	In	the	event	of	the	
UK	Government	negotiating	withdrawal	from	
these,	the	paper	argued	that	Scotland	should	
either	become	a	full	or	associated	member	of	the	
European	Free	Trade	Association,	or	have	direct	
association	with	the	EEA.	
Clearly,	the	prospect	of	Scotland	remaining	within	
the	Single	Market	while	England	and	Wales	do	not	
raises	considerable	practical	and	legal	difficulties,	
not	least	around	the	free	movement	of	money,	
goods,	services	and	people	across	two	separate	
markets.	The	Scottish	Government	argued	that	
these	need	not	be	insurmountable,	and	that	
innovative	solutions	could	be	found.	The	extent	of	
the	challenge	would	only	become	apparent	once	
the	UK’s	status	vis-à-vis	the	EU	was	made	clearer.	If	
the	UK-EU	agreement	minimises	tariffs	and	non-
tariff	barriers,	the	practical	obstacles	in	the	way	
of	a	differentiated	Brexit	for	Scotland	would	be	
reduced.
Overcoming	the	political	objections,	however,	was	
always	going	to	be	difficult.	In	contrast	to	Northern	
Ireland,	where	the	land	border	with	the	Republic	
of	Ireland	has	generated	political	commitment	in	
Dublin,	London	and	Brussels	to	find	a	compromise,	
there	is	little	sympathy	in	the	UK	Government	
for	a	differentiated	Brexit	deal	for	Scotland.	The	
proposition	was	formally	rejected	by	the	Secretary	
of	State	for	Exiting	the	EU	in	April.	
Brexit	also	catapulted	the	independence	issue	back	
to	the	top	of	the	political	agenda.	The	Scottish	
National	Party	(SNP)	manifesto	for	the	2016	
Scottish	Parliament	elections	sought	a	mandate	
to	hold	a	new	independence	referendum	if	there	
was	clear	demand,	or	if	there	was	a	“significant	
and	material	change	in	the	circumstances	that	
prevailed	in	2014,	such	as	Scotland	being	taken	
out	of	the	EU	against	our	will”.	A	majority	in	
the	Scottish	Parliament	(consisting	of	SNP	and	
Green	MSPs)	backed	the	Government’s	call	for	a	
referendum	once	the	terms	of	Brexit	were	known.	
Yet,	the	Scottish	Parliament	lacks	the	legal	authority	
to	hold	a	referendum	similar	to	the	2014	vote	and	
the	UK	Government	rejected	the	call,	declaring	that	
“now	is	not	the	time”.	The	Scottish	Conservatives’	
electoral	gains	and	the	SNP’s	losses	in	the	2017	
general	election	have	been	widely	interpreted	as	
public	rejection	of	an	early	referendum.	
The	process	toward	triggering	Article	50	had	
already	generated	a	step-change	in	formal	
intergovernmental	relations	between	the	UK	
Government	and	the	devolved	governments.	
But	the	Joint	Ministerial	Committee	(European	
Negotiations)	–	set	up	specifically	to	discuss	Brexit	
–	has	been	a	frustrating	process	for	all	involved	
(see	also	the	section	on	Wales).	Having	raised	
expectations	that	it	would	provide	an	avenue	for	
joint	agreement	on	a	UK	approach	prior	to	the	
triggering	of	Article	50,	it	singularly	failed	to	do	so.	
There	was	no	intergovernmental	discussion	of	the	
UK	Government’s	Brexit	position	prior	to	either	
the	prime	minister’s	Lancaster	House	speech,	the	
publication	of	the	White	Paper	or	the	triggering	
of	Article	50.	The	JMC	(EN)	was	also	supposed	to	
provide	the	devolved	governments	with	oversight	
of	negotiations	with	the	EU.	
The	JMC	process	may	be	difficult	to	resurrect	
without	a	functioning	Executive	in	Northern	
Ireland.	Besides,	prior	to	the	general	election	at	
least,	the	UK	Government’s	appetite	for	the	JMC	
(EN)	had	diminished,	as	had	the	expectations	of	
the	Scottish	Government	regarding	its	capacity	to	
uphold	its	remit.
Looking ahead
Both	the	UK	Conservatives	and	the	SNP	have	been	
humbled	by	the	general	election	results,	and	it	is	
not	yet	clear	how	this	will	affect	the	relationship	
between	their	two	governments.	The	coming	
year	will	be	dominated	by	the	Brexit	negotiations.	
Despite	the	first	minister’s	call	for	a	seat	at	the	
table,	the	Scottish	Government’s	capacity	to	
influence	negotiations	is	likely	to	remain	limited.	
On	the	other	hand,	the	Scottish	Conservative	
leader,	Ruth	Davidson,	buoyant	from	her	electoral	
success,	seems	intent	on	trying	to	influence	the	
UK’s	Brexit	stance.		
In	parallel,	the	introduction	of	the	Great	Repeal	Bill	
will	intensify	debate	about	the	repatriation	of	EU	
competences	and	their	impact	on	the	devolution	
settlements	(see	the	section	on	repatriation).	The	
prime	minister	has	insisted	that	EU	frameworks	
need	to	be	replaced	by	UK	frameworks	to	preserve	
the	UK	internal	market.	This	has	been	perceived	
by	the	SNP	as	an	attempt	to	weaken	the	powers	
of	the	Scottish	Parliament	by	expanding	the	areas	
where	the	Westminster	Parliament	has	exclusive	
competence.	The	Scottish	Government	doesn’t	
reject	the	need	for	common	UK	frameworks	to	
avoid	barriers	to	trade	and	mobility.	But	there	will	
be	tensions	over	who	gets	to	decide	what	such	
frameworks	would	entail,	who	owns	the	process	of	
overseeing	their	implementation,	and	who	wields	
the	power	should	disputes	emerge.
By Nicola McEwen
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in	partnership	with	Plaid	Cymru,	as	an	evidence-
based	contribution	to	the	UK	debate.	The	White 
Paper	–	‘Securing	Wales’	Future:	Transition	from	the	
European	Union	to	a	new	relationship	with	Europe’	
–	addressed	both	the	UK’s	future	relationship	
with	the	EU,	and	the	internal	functioning	of	the	
UK	post-Brexit,	as	a	union	of	four	nations	(see	the	
contributions	by	Jo	Hunt and Michael	Keating).	
The	Welsh	Government	presents	a	contrasting	
vision	of	Brexit	to	that	proposed	by	the	UK	
Government.	Not	least,	it	prefers	continued	
participation	in	both	the	single	market	and	the	
Customs	Union.	The	Welsh	Government	also	
stresses	the	importance	of	freedom	of	movement,	
although	asserts	that	there	ought	to	be	a	
stronger	link	between	freedom	of	movement	and	
employment	than	is	currently	exercised	in	the	UK.	It	
calls	for	continued	Welsh	involvement	in	a	number	
of	EU	programmes,	including	Horizon	2020	(for	
science	and	research),	ERASMUS+	(education	and	
training),	Creative	Europe	(supporting	cultural	and	
creative	sectors)	and	the	Ireland-Wales	Programme	
(a	European	Territorial	Cooperation	programme	
that	connects	organisations,	businesses	and	
communities).	It	also	seeks	for	the	UK	to	remain	a	
partner	in	the	European	Investment	Bank.	
Despite	these	contrasting	positions,	the	Welsh	
Government	has	consistently	emphasised	areas	
of	complementarity	with	the	UK	Government,	
insisting	that	their	positions	are	“not	
irreconcilable”.	It	is	in	this	cooperative	spirit	that	
the	Welsh	Government	has	participated	in	the	
cross-nations	forum	on	Brexit:	the	Joint	Ministerial	
Committee	on	European	Negotiations	or	JMC	
(EN),	established	on	24	October	2016.	This	forum	
“seek[s]	to	agree	a	UK	approach	to,	and	objectives	
for,	Article	50	negotiations”.	However,	even	the	
most	measured	participants	have	been	moved	
to	express	some	exasperation.	Both	the	Welsh	
and	Scottish	representatives	(Cabinet	Secretary	
Mark	Drakeford	and	Minister	Michael	Russell,	
respectively)	have	been	outspoken	in	their	critique	
of	the	forum,	with	Drakeford	stating	that,	“St	
Fagans	Community	Council,	in	my	constituency,	
Introduction
On	24	June	2016,	Wales	awoke	on	the	“winning	
side”	of	the	EU	referendum.	17	of	22	local	
authority	areas	had	voted	“Leave”,	totalling	
52.5%	of	those	who	went	to	the	polls.	And	
this	against	a	backdrop	of	high	levels	of	EU	
funding,	a	devolution	settlement	premised	on	
EU	membership,	and	overwhelming	support	for	
“Remain”	from	Welsh	politicians	and	sectoral	
organisations.	So	began	Wales’	Brexit	journey:	a	
divided	nation	with	a	weak	bargaining	hand,	yet	
with	distinct	interests	to	protect	both	within	the	
UK	and	within	Europe.
Wales’ journey since the EU referendum
The	Leave	vote	in	Wales	placed	the	Welsh	
Government	in	an	unenviable	position.	Prior	to	
the	EU	referendum,	it	had	vehemently	expressed	
its	preference	for	Remain,	asserting	that	the	risks	
of	Brexit	were	manifold	in	financial,	economic	
and	political	terms.	Indeed,	as	a	beneficiary	from	
EU	funds	(totalling	£658	million	in	2014)	and	a	
small	nation	for	whom	the	Single	Market	holds	
particular	significance,	this	pro-EU	position	had	
been	rather	taken	for	granted	in	Welsh	politics.	
The	voting	public,	however,	did	not	agree.	
The	Leave	vote	left	the	Welsh	Government	without	
a	mandate	to	advocate	its	pro-EU	position.	Added	
to	this	is	the	Welsh	Government’s	weak	bargaining	
hand	in	its	dealings	with	the	UK	Government.	In	
this,	Wales	differs	from	Scotland	(through	calls	for	
a	second	independence	referendum)	and	Northern	
Ireland	(with	acutely	sensitive	political	issues	that	
demand	attention),	both	of	which	voted	Remain.	
During	the	summer	of	2016,	the	political	institutions	
of	Wales	set	to	work	preparing	themselves	for	the	
UK’s	prospective	withdrawal	from	the	EU.	The	Welsh	
Government	established inter alia	an	EU	Transition	
Team	to	coordinate	all	Brexit	activity,	and	a	European	
Advisory	Group	of	external	stakeholders.	The	
response	of	the	National	Assembly	for	Wales	was	
swift	and	decisive.	Days	after	the	EU	referendum,	it	
issued	a	report	outlining	some	of	the	implications	of	
the	referendum	for	Wales.	It	then	embarked	upon	a	
programme	of	research	and	analysis,	spearheaded	
by	the	newly	created	Committee	on	External	Affairs	
and	Additional	Legislation.	The	Committee	launched	
its	report,	‘Implications	for	Wales	of	leaving	the	
European	Union’	in	early	January	2017,	in	which	it	
clearly	outlined	the	priority	areas	for	Wales	and	a	
scrutiny	role	for	the	Assembly.
The	Welsh	Government’s	white	paper	on	Brexit	
was	released	later	that	month,	on	23	January	2017,	
would	be	better	organised	than	most	JMC	
meetings	have	been.”	Indeed,	there	is	little	to	
indicate	that	the	UK	Government	has	engaged	
seriously	with	the	devolved	administrations.	This	
does	not	bode	well	for	the	latter’s	role	in	the	Brexit	
negotiations	themselves,	something	both	the	
Welsh	and	Scottish	Governments	have	called	for.
What next for Wales? 
Today,	Wales	is	working	to	protect	its	future	
both	within	the	UK	and	within	Europe.	Of	central	
importance	to	Wales	is	the	Great	Repeal	Bill,	and	
its	consequences	for	devolution	and	the	future	of	
the	UK’s	own	union	(see	Jo	Hunt’s	contribution).	
Attached	to	this	are	fundamental	questions	about	
how	powers	will	be	repatriated	to	the	UK,	how	
(or	indeed	whether)	lost	EU	funds	(specifically	
for	agriculture	and	regional	development	policy)	
will	be	compensated	for	via	UK	domestic	sources,	
and	how	Welsh	interests	will	be	protected	in	
international	trade	deals.	Beyond	this,	during	the	
negotiations	themselves,	Wales	will	continue	work	
to	defend	its	key	industries,	seeking	to	ensure	
sufficient	levels	of	migration	and	pushing	for	a	
close	relationship	between	the	UK	and	the	EU.
However,	whatever	the	final	relationship	between	
the	UK	and	the	EU,	Wales	is	investing	in	its	own	
future	in	Europe,	as	a	“European	nation”	in	its	
own	right.	As	it	stands,	from	the	Welsh	outpost	in	
Brussels	(Wales	House),	a	number	of	organisations	
work	to	advance	Welsh	interests	and	support	Welsh	
participation	in	collaborative	ventures	with	a	range	of	
national	and	regional	actors.	Much	of	this	European	
activity	already	reaches	beyond	the	EU,	providing	
foundations	upon	which	to	build	post-Brexit.	Indeed,	
Welsh	engagement	with	Europe	is	set	to	continue	
following	the	UK’s	withdrawal	from	the	EU,	albeit	
tailored	to	a	renewed	set	of	circumstances.
By Rachel Minto
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view	of	the	constitution	in	which	sovereignty	must	
be	in	one	place.	The	majority	in	Scotland	and	
Northern	Ireland,	however,	voted	Remain,	wanting	
to	remain	in	both	the	UK	and	European	unions.	
Now	they	are	forced	to	choose.
From then till now  
Brexit	therefore	presents	a	severe	challenge	to	the	
UK’s	evolving	constitution.	We	can	illustrate	this	
by	three	developments	in	the	year	since	the	Brexit	
vote.
The	first	is	the	judgment	of	the	Supreme	Court	
in the Miller	case,	which	primarily	concerned	
whether	Parliament	needed	to	approve	the	
Government’s	triggering	of	Article	50,	giving	
notice	of	withdrawal	from	the	EU.	The	Scottish	
Government	joined	the	case	to	argue	that	it	would	
also	need	the	consent	of	the	devolved	legislatures.	
This	is	because	it	would	require	changes	in	the	
devolution	acts	in	various	ways.	At	the	minimum	
the	provisions	binding	them	to	act	within	EU	law	
will	have	to	be	removed.	The	Supreme	Court	
could	have	ruled	that	the	convention	was	not	
applicable	because	the	situation	was	not	“normal”,	
or	because	the	EU	comes	under	foreign	affairs	and	
is	not	devolved.	Instead,	at	the	urging	of	the	UK	
Government’s	Advocate	General,	it	ruled	that	the	
convention	was	a	mere	political	device	and	not	
binding	in	any	circumstances.
The	second	issue	concerns	the	idea	that	
Scotland	and	Northern	Ireland	might	have	a	
differentiated	from	of	Brexit,	allowing	them	to	
remain	in	parts	of	the	EU,	including	the	Single	
Market,	even	as	the	rest	of	the	UK	withdraws.	A	
plan	was	presented	by	the	Scottish	Government	
in	December	2016.	Nationalists	in	Northern	
Ireland	have	made	their	own	suggestions	for	a	
differentiated	settlement,	although	unionists	
have	opposed	the	idea.	The	UK	Government	
response	is	that	there	must	be	a	“UK	approach”	
in	which	the	whole	of	the	UK	must	in	the	future	
have	the	same	relationship	with	the	EU.
Introduction
There	are	two	very	different	views	of	the	
UK’s	largely	unwritten	constitution.	One,	the	
“Westminster”	view,	is	based	on	the	principle	of	
parliamentary	sovereignty	and	supremacy.	This	
holds	that	the	UK	Parliament	is	the	supreme	
source	of	law	and	can	do	anything	except	bind	
itself.	Parliament,	in	turn,	is	answerable	to	
a	unitary	British	nation.	It	is	this	view	of	the	
constitution	that	clashes	with	the	European	
project,	which	is	based	on	a	philosophy	of	sharing	
sovereignty	and	power.
The	other	view,	widely	held	in	Scotland	and	the	
other	UK	nations,	is	that	the	United	Kingdom	is	
a	union	of	nations,	each	of	which	has	its	own	
relationship	with	the	centre.	Devolution	since	
1999	has	reinforced	this	view	by	providing	
Scotland,	Northern	Ireland	and	Wales	with	their	
own	elected	legislatures	and	governments.	It	is	
further	strengthened	by	the	“Sewel	Convention”	
under	which	Westminster	will	not	“normally”	
pass	laws	in	devolved	areas	without	the	consent	
of	the	Scottish	Parliament,	National	Assembly	
for	Wales	or	Northern	Ireland	Assembly.	The	
convention	was	put	into	law	in	the	Scotland	Act	
(2016)	and	the	Wales	Act	(2017).	The	Northern	
Ireland	settlement	rejects	the	idea	that	there	is	a	
unitary	British	people.	Instead,	it	allows	people	to	
define	themselves	as	British,	Irish,	Northern	Irish	
of	any	combination	of	those.	It	also	provides	that	
the	people	of	Northern	Ireland	can	vote	to	join	the	
Republic	of	Ireland.
The constitution and the EU
This	“devolved”	view	of	the	constitution	is	
entirely	consistent	with	the	European	project.	
The	United	Kingdom	and	the	EU	are	both	unions	
in	which	different	nations	share	power.	Both	are	
open-ended,	without	a	clear	end	point.	Rather	
they	adjust	according	to	the	times.	The	issue	
of	sovereignty	is	fudged	and	never	absolutely	
resolved.
Opinion	surveys	have	repeatedly	shown	that	the	
people	of	Scotland	and	Northern	Ireland	have	no	
problem	with	multiple	layers	of	authority.	Our	
work	on	the	Scottish	independence	referendum	
showed	that,	despite	being	forced	to	choose	
between	independence	and	the	union,	most	
voters	continued	to	prefer	something	in	between.	
In	Northern	Ireland,	the	power-sharing	settlement	
has	gained	cross-community	support.	The	
numbers	of	people	in	Scotland	and	Northern	
Ireland	who	want	to	put	all	the	sovereignty	in	one	
place	is	small.
The	argument	for	Brexit	was	to	“take	back	control”,	
and	restore	the	supremacy	of	the	UK	Parliament	
and	people	by	eliminating	the	provisions	that	
made	UK	law	subordinate	to	EU	law	in	fields	where	
the	EU	is	competent.	This	reflects	the	Westminster	
The	third	issue	concerns	those	powers	currently	
held	by	the	EU	which	are	also	devolved	within	the	
United	Kingdom.	The	main	ones	are	agriculture,	
fisheries,	the	environment	and	some	aspects	of	
justice	and	home	affairs.	The	UK	Government’s	
position	is	that	all	powers	will	come	back	to	
Westminster,	which	can	then	decide	which	ones	
to	pass	down	to	the	devolved	level.	The	Scottish	
and	Welsh	Governments	have	argued	that	these	
powers	constitutionally	belong	to	them.	There	
might	need	to	be	UK	frameworks	to	replace	
European	frameworks	but	these	would	have	to	be	
negotiated	voluntarily	among	the	four	nations.
What lies ahead? 
Brexit	exposes	very	different	views	of	the	UK	
constitution,	something	that	has	not	had	to	be	
addressed	since	devolution	in	the	late	1990s.	
The	UK	Government’s	positions	have	implied	a	
reaffirmation	of	Westminster	supremacy	at	odds	
with	developments	since	1999	and	tending	to	
centralisation.
The	issue	could	be	resolved	by	the	UK	breaking	up,	
with	Scotland	and	Northern	Ireland	remaining	in	
the	EU.	Alternatively,	it	could	be	resolved	by	the	
UK	Government	imposing	its	will	and	leaving	the	
EU	on	terms	set	by	itself.	The	result	of	the	General	
Election	suggests	that	neither	the	UK	Government,	
with	its	unitary	view	of	the	constitution,	nor	the	
Scottish	or	Irish	nationalists,	are	strong	enough	to	
allow	either	of	these	to	happen.	Instead,	Brexit	will	
remain	entwined	in	the	changing	constitutional	
politics	of	the	UK.
By Michael Keating
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Introduction
Two	claims	were	made	during	the	referendum	
campaign	concerning	the	implications	of	Brexit	for	
the	UK’s	regions,	cities	and	nations.	The	first	was	
that	the	major	beneficiaries	of	EU	membership	
were	the	“metropolitan	elites”	in	London,	while	
the	rest	of	the	country	was	largely	deprived	of	
the	benefits	of	EU	membership.	This	theme	
reappeared	on	many	occasions,	and	was	referred	
to	by	many	high	profile	Leave	advocates.	It	also	
frequently	re-surfaced	when	the	members	of	the	
public	were	interviewed	by	the	media,	suggesting	
that,	as	a	campaign	slogan,	it	had	gained	real	
traction.	Indeed,	the	geography	of	the	referendum	
result	provided	further	evidence	for	the	
“metropolitan	elite”	argument	within	England	and	
Wales,	revealing,	as	it	did,	a	stark	division	between	
pro-Remain	London	and	its	hinterland	and	the	rest	
of	the	country.	
The	“metropolitan	elite”	argument	was	always	
about	London,	not	cities	in	general.	There	was	
never	any	suggestion	that	pro-Leave	advocates	
had	places	like	Liverpool	in	mind	when	they	
referred	to	“elites”.	And	it	was	never	based	on	any	
empirical	evidence.	
The	second,	interrelated	claim,	was	that	the	UK	
has	a	very	strong	economic	hand	to	play	in	the	
Brexit	negotiations	because	of	its	balance	of	
payments	deficit	with	the	rest	of	the	EU.	As	such,	
other	EU	member	states	will	be	eager	to	agree	
a	comprehensive	free	trade	deal	with	the	UK	in	
order	to	protect	their	trade	surplus.	This	argument	
finds	little	support	in	modern	economics.	In	
contrast,	most	economists	agree	that	the	strength	
of	the	UK’s	position	can	only	be	understood	in	
terms	of	the	impact	of	trade	and	foreign	direct	
investment	on	all	economic	activity	taking	place	
in	the	domestic	economy,	irrespective	of	whether	
those	activities	are	themselves	involved	in	trade	or	
not.	Crucially,	trade	surplus	or	deficit	levels	simply	
have	no	relevance	for	these	issues.	Again,	the	
truth	of	this	claim	can	only	be	tested	by	examining	
how	the	international	and	interregional	trade	
structures	of	the	UK’s	regions	affect	their	internal	
economic	performance.	
Testing the claims
Testing	both	claims	requires	moving	beyond	
simple	numbers	regarding	the	levels	or	changes	in	
gross	exports	and	imports,	because	these	numbers	
actually	tell	us	very	little	about	the	economic	
dependence	of	a	country,	a	city	or	a	region,	on	its	
trade	relationships.	Modern	global	value	chains	
involve	moving	goods	and	services	across	many	
different	borders	multiple	times	before	a	final	
product	or	service	is	produced.	This	means	that	
only	a	sophisticated	analysis	based	on	detailed	
data	linking	trade	patterns	to	domestic	economic	
structures	and	patterns	can	uncover	these	
relationships.
This	shows	us	that,	firstly,	the	“metropolitan	
elite”	argument	is	completely	wrong.	London	is	
less	dependent	on	the	EU	for	its	prosperity	than	
anywhere	else	in	the	UK.	Indeed,	the	regions	
which	voted	Leave	tend	to	be	the	regions	which	
are	most	dependent	on	EU	markets	for	their	
prosperity.	This	strongly	suggests	that	it	is	the	
UK’s	weaker	regions	which	are	most	exposed	to	
Brexit.  
Secondly,	in	economic	terms,	the	UK	and	its	
regions	are	far	more	exposed	to	Brexit	trade-
related	risks	than	regions	in	any	other	EU	member	
state	except	the	Republic	of	Ireland.	Even	
countries	such	as	Germany	or	the	Netherlands	will	
be	less	affected	by	Brexit	than	the	UK,	while	many	
other	member	states	will	feel	almost	no	effect.	
This	suggests	that	the	economic	strength	of	the	
UK’s	negotiating	position	is	far	weaker	than	most	
of	the	UK	public	understands.	
The regional rather than just the sectoral 
dimension
Until	now,	much	of	the	discussion	on	Brexit	
has	been	dominated	by	the	potential	impact	
on	particular	industries	such	as	automobiles	or	
finance	and	whether	this	would	require	specific	
deals	for	certain	industries.	Importantly,	however,	
this	discussion	has	overlooked	the	fact	that	the	
specific	details	of	the	final	UK-EU	agreement	are	
likely	to	have	very	different	impacts	on	different	
parts	of	the	UK,	and	have	the	potential	to	
undermine	much	of	the	economic	“rebalancing”	
agenda	that	is	currently	being	widely	discussed	
domestically.	The	impacts	of	Brexit	on	the	UK’s	
devolved	administrations	and	city-regions	are	likely	
to	differ	markedly	depending	on	the	terms	of	the	
final	UK-EU	agreement,	and	there	are	now	growing	
voices	that	advocate	a	greater	involvement	of	
different	parts	of	the	UK	in	the	negotiations.	
Current	political	debates	focus	on	the	role	that	the	
devolved	administrations	may	play	in	the	Brexit	
negotiations,	but	these	give	little	or	no	attention	
to	the	issues	affecting	the	rest	of	the	country.	
Taken	together,	the	populations	of	the	recently	
constituted	city-region	combined	authorities	
are	much	larger	than	the	total	populations	of	
the	three	devolved	administrations,	although	
these	areas	barely	figure	in	current	discussions.	
Furthermore,	many	of	the	smaller	towns	and	rural	
areas	which	voted	strongly	for	Brexit,	and	which	
are	likely	to	be	the	most	adversely	affected	by	it,	
effectively	have	no	representation	whatsoever.	
Although	various	local	government	leaders	have	
raised	these	issues,	this	has	achieved	little	or	
no	broader	resonance.	However,	as	the	Brexit	
negotiations	proceed	and	the	potential	impacts	
on	different	areas	start	to	become	clearer,	it	may	
be	that	the	UK’s	cities	and	regions	become	more	
involved	in	the	process.	
By Philip McCann and Raquel Ortega-Argilés
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be	the	main	loser	in	any	resulting	restructurings	
because	of	the	relative	size	of	the	two	markets.	
And	labour	migration	–	particularly	of	highly	skilled	
workers	–	appears	to	have	slowed.	None	of	these	
spell	imminent	disaster,	but	all	will	damage	the	
UK’s	long-term	growth	prospects,	very	much	as	
predicted	before	the	referendum.	
Meanwhile,	Brexit	has	precipitated	significant	
changes	in	the	orientation	of	domestic	economic	
policy,	with	less	emphasis	on	fiscal	restraint	or	
deregulation	than	in	the	Osborne-Cameron	era;	
indeed,	the	May	government	is	arguably	the	least	
“liberal”	in	economic	orientation	for	four	decades.	
Finally,	the	notion	that	Brexit	will	lead	to	an	overall	
reduction	in	“red	tape”	now	seems	increasingly	
absurd.	Rather,	increased	bureaucracy	and	
government	intervention	appear	likely.	Even	on	
an	optimistic	reading,	business	faces	the	prospect	
of	being	forced	to	implement	new	immigration	
controls	on	EU	workers,	new	workers’	rights,	and	
cope	with	customs	checks	at	borders.	
What happens next?
In	the	short	term,	the	economy	appears	to	be	
gradually	slowing.	Growth	fell	to	0.2%	in	the	
first	quarter	of	2017	(down	from	0.7%	in	the	
fourth	quarter	of	2015)	and	recent	indicators	
of	consumer	and	business	confidence	have	
been	weak.	However,	employment	remains	at	
historically	high	levels	and	there	is	little	evidence	
yet	of	a	dramatic	reversal.	Unemployment	may	
rise,	although	not	rapidly.	Once	again,	this	is	the	
central	view;	there	are	as	always	risks	to	both	the	
upside	and	downside	–	with	the	latter	perhaps	
rather	larger.	The	inconclusive	result	of	the	
election	adds	a	further	element	of	uncertainty	in	
the	short	term.	
But	what	will	be	crucial	over	the	next	year	is	the	
interaction	between	the	economics	of	Brexit	
and	the	politics	of	the	negotiations.	Under	one	
scenario,	the	negotiations	progress	well,	with	a	
relatively	early	agreement	on	the	broad	terms	
of	withdrawal,	a	constructive	approach	on	both	
Introduction
The	Remain	campaign	made	the	economic	
consequences	of	Brexit	the	central	element	of	
their	case.	In	this,	they	were	supported	by	the	
apparatus	of	government,	the	key	international	
economic	institutions,	and	the	vast	majority	of	
academic	economists.	Most	forecasters	predicted	
that	a	Brexit	vote	would	lead,	in	the	short	term,	
to	a	sharp	fall	in	the	exchange	rate;	turbulence	in	
financial	markets;	and,	over	the	subsequent	few	
months,	to	a	significant	slowdown	in	growth	(with	
the	Treasury	predicting	a	mild	recession).	Credible	
analyses	of	the	long-term	economic	impact	of	
Brexit	foresaw	a	significant	hit	to	Gross	Domestic	
Product	(GDP),	although	with	considerable	
uncertainty	over	the	precise	magnitude	of	this	
impact.	While	some	elements	of	this	campaign	
may	well	have	backfired	–	in	particular,	George	
Osborne’s	“punishment	budget”,	widely	regarded	
as	political	posturing	rather	than	credible	
economics	–	most	polls	suggested	that	voters	
expected	Brexit	to	damage	the	UK	economy.	
What’s happened since the referendum?
In	the	short	run,	however,	any	damage	was	
minimal.	The	pound	did	fall	sharply,	but	stabilised	
and	has	recovered	somewhat	in	the	last	few	
months.	The	Bank	of	England	cut	interest	rates	
in	August	and	announced	further	quantitative	
easing;	this	appears	to	have	supported	markets	
and	business	confidence.	Financial	markets,	in	
the	UK	as	globally,	have	been	buoyant	to	the	
point	where	many	fear	they	are	overvalued.	Most	
importantly,	growth	and	employment	held	up	
well.	Indeed,	the	main	strengths	(a	remarkably	
resilient	labour	market,	strong	consumer	spending	
and	steady	growth	in	the	services	sector)	and	
weaknesses	(weak	private	and	public	investment,	
poor	productivity	growth	and	a	very	large	current	
account	deficit)	of	the	UK	economy	remained	
largely	as	they	were	before	the	referendum.
However,	the	poor	record	of	short-term	forecasts	
concerning	the	impact	of	the	Brexit	vote	tell	us	
almost	nothing	about	longer-term	predictions.	
Here,	the	indications	–	albeit	tentative	at	this	point	
–	are	both	gloomier	and	more	consistent	with	the	
economic	consensus.	As	expected,	some	financial	
sector	jobs	and	investment	are	being	relocated	
elsewhere	in	the	EU.	So	far	this	is	a	trickle,	but	
it	seems	likely	to	accelerate	as	the	negotiations	
progress	with	little	or	no	prospect	of	any	early	
deal	on	continued	market	access.	Companies	
that	rely	on	pan-European	supply	chains	are	
making	contingency	plans	to	deal	with	border	
controls	and/or	trade	barriers;	the	UK	stands	to	
sides	towards	the	longer-term	relationship,	and,	
crucially,	an	extended	“implementation”	phase	
after	Brexit	in	which	little	or	nothing	changes	with	
respect	to	the	UK’s	economic	relationship	with	
the	EU27.	This	would	maintain	confidence	and	
give	firms	time	to	adjust;	any	negative	impacts	
would	be	spread	over	a	longer	period	and,	at	the	
same	time,	the	UK	could	begin	to	pursue	deeper	
economic	relationships	with	non-EU	countries.	
This	scenario	would	also	help	give	the	UK	
Government	political	space	to	make	the	necessary	
compromises	needed	to	secure	a	successful	
outcome.	
However,	if	negotiations	stall,	or	worse,	break	
down	entirely	while	the	Article	50	clock	keeps	
ticking,	the	risk	is	that	there	is	a	rapid	erosion	in	
business	and	consumer	confidence	as	fears	of	a	
“cliff-edge”	or,	still	worse,	a	“chaotic”	Brexit	grow.	
At	its	worst,	this	could	spiral,	with	a	succession	
of	announcements	of	business	relocations	in	
a	variety	of	sectors.	This	would	also	spill	over	
into	financial	markets,	with	a	further	fall	in	the	
pound.	Politically,	there	would	again	be	feedback	
loops,	this	time	negative,	given	the	Government’s	
domestic	political	weakness.	From	an	economic	
perspective,	the	last	year	may	well	prove	to	have	
been	the	calm	before	the	storm.	
By Jonathan Portes
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Faced	with	these	trade-offs,	Theresa	May’s	
government	wants	to	prioritise	sovereignty.	The	
Government	hopes	to	end	free	movement	of	
labour	and	to	remove	the	UK	from	the	jurisdiction	
of	the	ECJ.	Consequently,	Prime	Minister	May	
announced	in	January	2017	that	the	UK	would	
leave	both	the	Single	Market	and	the	Customs	
Union,	and	would	seek	a	new	free	trade	
agreement	with	the	EU.	The	Government	also	
signalled	it	was	willing	to	leave	without	a	deal	if	
a	sufficiently	attractive	agreement	could	not	be	
reached.	This	approach	was	driven	primarily	by	
the	prime	minister’s	need	to	secure	support	from	
voters	who	backed	Brexit	to	take	back	control	from	
the	EU.	However,	the	Conservatives’	failure	to	win	
a	majority	of	seats	in	the	general	election	means	
the	Government	is	now	under	pressure	to	appeal	
to	a	broader	coalition	of	voters	by	developing	a	
Brexit	plan	that	is	less	harmful	to	the	economy.
Negotiating a free trade agreement
If	the	UK	does	leave	the	Single	Market	and	the	
Customs	Union,	what	type	of	free	trade	agreement	
should	it	aim	for?	The	most	basic	agreement	
would	simply	ban	tariffs	on	UK-EU	trade.	But	
economic	analysis	finds	the	largest	potential	
costs	of	Brexit	come	not	from	the	threat	of	tariffs,	
but	from	higher	non-tariff	trade	barriers	due	to	
the	imposition	of	customs	procedures	and	the	
emergence	of	regulatory	differences	between	the	
UK	and	the	EU.	An	ambitious	free	trade	agreement	
needs	to	go	beyond	tariffs	and	take	steps	to	
keep	these	non-tariff	barriers	low.	This	means	
finding	creative	ways	to	minimise	border	checks	
and	ensure	that	changes	to	UK	regulation	do	
not	create	new	trade	costs	–	a	goal	that	conflicts	
with	the	desire	to	reassert	national	control	over	
regulatory	policy.	As	will	become	increasingly	
apparent	during	the	Brexit	negotiations,	giving	up	
control	is	the	price	countries	pay	to	keep	trade	
costs	low.	
It	is	also	important	for	the	UK	that	any	agreement	
covers	services	industries.	Close	to	half	the	UK’s	
trade	is	in	services,	but	most	agreements	do	little	to	
reduce	barriers	to	services	trade.	Even	Switzerland	
does	not	have	a	comprehensive	services	trade	
agreement	with	the	EU,	despite	allowing	free	
One	year	ago,	the	UK	voted	to	leave	the	EU.	
However,	voters	did	not	choose	what	would	come	
after	Brexit.	
Options for “life after Brexit”
One	option	is	to	remain	in	the	Single	Market	and	
preserve	the	free	movement	of	goods,	services,	
capital	and	labour	with	the	EU.	Another	is	to	
negotiate	a	bespoke	trade	agreement	with	the	
EU	that	keeps	trade	barriers	as	low	as	possible	
while	ending	labour	mobility	and	giving	the	UK	
greater	control	over	economic	regulation.	Finally,	
if	no	deal	is	reached,	the	UK	and	EU	would	trade	
under	World	Trade	Organization	(WTO)	terms.	
This	means	the	UK	would	have	much	the	same	
economic	relations	with	the	EU	as	with	non-EU	
countries	such	as	the	US	or	Japan.	It	would	lead	to	
tariffs	on	goods	trade	and	reduced	market	access	
for	service	exporters.
Each	of	these	alternatives	was	endorsed	by	
different	factions	of	the	Leave	campaign	prior	to	
the	referendum.	Asking	voters	what	they	prefer	
does	not	resolve	the	conundrum:	opinion	polls	
show	support	for	maintaining	the	benefits	of	Single	
Market	membership.	Yet	polls	also	find	support	
for	taking	back	control	by	restricting	immigration	
and	removing	the	UK	from	the	jurisdiction	of	the	
European	Court	of	Justice	(ECJ)	(though	see	the	
section	on	public	opinion).
European	integration	brings	economic	benefits	
by	reducing	barriers	to	trade	and	investment.	
But,	to	reap	these	benefits,	countries	must	
give	up	unilateral	control	over	some	areas	of	
economic	policy.	For	example,	harmonising	
product	standards	across	the	EU	creates	export	
opportunities	for	UK	businesses	because	they	
do	not	have	to	satisfy	different	regulations	in	
different	markets.	But,	harmonisation	is	only	
possible	if	all	countries	agree	to	adopt	the	same	
standards,	which	means	giving	up	national	
control	of	regulation.	Similarly,	the	EU’s	 
Customs	Union	keeps	trade	costs	low	by	allowing	
goods	to	cross	borders	without	facing	customs	
controls.	However,	countries	that	belong	to	the	
Customs	Union	cannot	have	independent	trade	
policies.
The integration–sovereignty trade-off
As	it	leaves	the	EU,	the	UK	must	choose	whether	
to	prioritise	maintaining	economic	integration	
or	asserting	its	sovereignty.	This	choice	will	have	
important	economic	consequences.	Research	
conducted	with	colleagues	at	the	Centre	for	
Economic	Performance	at	the	London	School	
of	Economics	found	that	the	fall	in	UK	living	
standards	caused	by	Brexit	would	be	twice	as	
large	if	trade	reverts	to	WTO	terms	than	if	the	UK	
stays	in	the	Single	Market.	
movement	of	labour.	No	trade	agreement	will	offer	
the	same	market	access	that	membership	of	the	
Single	Market	provides,	particularly	for	financial	
services,	but	the	UK	should	seek	to	keep	barriers	to	
services	trade	as	low	as	possible.
To	secure	a	good	deal	with	the	EU,	the	UK	must	
be	patient	and	willing	to	compromise.	Trade	
negotiations	are	lengthy,	complex	and	often	
contentious.	There	is	little	chance	an	ambitious	
agreement	can	be	reached	before	Brexit	occurs	in	
March	2019,	so	the	UK’s	first	objective	should	be	
to	negotiate	a	transition	arrangement	to	govern	
UK-EU	relations	until	a	longer-term	agreement	is	
possible.	To	give	adequate	time	for	negotiations,	
the	transition	arrangement	should	last	until	at	
least	2022.	And	to	avoid	economic	disruption,	it	
should	mimic	the	status	quo	as	closely	as	possible.
Once	longer-term	negotiations	begin,	progress	
will	require	the	UK	to	make	concessions.	Possible	
concessions	include	making	payments	to	the	EU	
budget,	agreeing	EU	regulations	will	continue	
to	apply	in	some	industries,	and	guaranteeing	
immigration	rights	for	EU	citizens	offered	a	job	in	
the	UK.	The	UK	has	a	weaker	negotiating	position	
than	the	EU,	so	even	with	these	concessions	it	is	
unlikely	to	achieve	all	its	objectives.	But	refusing	
to	compromise	will	guarantee	failure.	Research	
estimates	that	leaving	the	EU	without	a	deal	could	
reduce	UK	income	per	capita	by	up	to	10%	in	the	
worst-case	scenario.
Where next?
As	Brexit	approaches,	the	UK	is	facing	more	
challenges	than	opportunities.	From	an	economic	
perspective,	the	question	is	not	whether	Brexit	
will	harm	living	standards,	but	how	large	the	
cost	will	be.	Following	the	general	election,	the	
Government	needs	to	ask	how	much	voters	are	
willing	to	pay	to	assert	their	sense	of	national	
identity.	If	leaving	the	Single	Market	is	viewed	as	
too	costly,	the	UK	is	headed	in	the	wrong	direction.
By Thomas Sampson
FIFTEEN
3534
PART FOUR: BREXIT AND THE ECONOMY
close	to	the	gross	amount	(after	deducting	the	UK	
rebate)	the	UK	was	expected	to	pay	into	the	EU	
budget	over	the	entire	span	of	the	2014-20	MFF.	
Unsurprisingly,	messages	from	the	UK	side	dismiss	
these	claims	which,	it	has	to	be	emphasised,	
no-one	on,	EU	Brexit	negotiator,	Michel	Barnier’s	
team	has	formally	made.	
An	arguably	rather	vindictive	proposal	in	an	EU	
briefing	document	published	at	the	end	of	May	
2017	suggests	the	UK	may	also	be	asked	to	pay	for	
relocating	EU	agencies	from	the	UK,	such	as	the	
European	Banking	Authority,	as	well	as	the	salaries	
of	teachers	at	the	European	Schools	in	Brussels.	
The	Bank	of	England	can,	however,	look	forward	
to	recovering	its	paid-in	capital	from	the	European	
Central	Bank.
If	€100	billion	is	fanciful,	as	researchers	from	
Bruegel	imply,	what	is	realistic?	Despite	a	House	
of	Lords	Committee’s	verdict	that	there	is	no	
legal	obligation	to	pay,	British	ministers	have	
been	careful	not	to	rule	out	some	payment,	using	
language	such	as	“obey	our	legal	obligations”	
[David	Davis].	Even	so,	the	UK	is	reluctant	to	
countenance	an	early	agreement,	for	fear	of	a	
negative	public	reaction.
What sort of compromise could be envisaged? 
As	explained	in an earlier paper,	the	main	elements	
of	a	financial	settlement	are	not	unduly	complex.	
They	turn	on:	the	extent	to	which	the	UK	accepts	
that	it	is	bound	by	the	commitments	made	for	
the	full	duration	of	the	MFF,	and	not	just	up	to	the	
date	of	Brexit;	the	share	of	total	commitments	the	
UK	should	bear;	and	on	apportioning	the	assets	
and	liabilities	(notably	pensions)	of	the	EU.	The	EU	
position	is	to	use	the	total	transferred	by	the	UK	from	
2014-18	as	a	proportion	of	the	total	transferred	by	
all	member	states.	Extrapolating	from	the	data	for	
2014-16,	this	would	mean	a	ratio	of	around	12%.	
A	neat	answer	might	be	to	allow	the	2014-20	
MFF	to	play	out	as	part	of	a	broader	transitional	
deal,	implying	the	UK	continues	to	pay	in	until	the	
end	of	2020,	while	continuing	to	receive	its	share	
of	EU	funding	for	agricultural	support,	regional	
development	and	research.	This	solution	has	the	
pragmatic	advantage	of	enabling	the	Government	
to	fulfil	the	promise	to	maintain	funding	until	the	
end	of	2020	to	UK	beneficiaries	from	these	EU	
programmes.	For	the	EU	side,	higher	payments	
to	Brussels	or	cuts	in	EU	programmes	would	be	
avoided	for	the	2014-20	MFF,	although	the	issue	
will	return	with	a	vengeance	when	the	next	MFF	
has	to	be	negotiated,	most	probably	while	Brexit	
negotiations	are	heading	towards	a	conclusion	in	
late	2018.	Using	Treasury	projections,	the	net	cost	
to	UK	taxpayers	would	be	of	the	order	of	£18	billion	
(€22	billion)	from	April	2019	to	the	end	of	2020.	
RAL	would	still	be	a	problem	because,	under	EU	
rules,	claims	for	EU	regional	programmes	are	
allowed	up	to	three	years	beyond	2020;	as	would	
the	balance	of	assets	and	liabilities.	The	amount	
of	RAL	changes	from	year	to	year	as	projects	are	
completed	and	new	multi-year	commitments	are	
contracted,	but	is	typically	in	the	range	of	€200-
300	billion.	Whether	the	UK	should	be	liable	for	
a	proportion	of	RAL	is	negotiable:	the	UK	could	
argue	there	was	already	a	stock	of	RAL	from	the	
previous	MFF	and	it	should	only	be	liable	for	a	
share	of	the	change	in	RAL,	whereas	the	EU	side	
could	insist	the	UK	pay	its	share	of	the	full	stock.	
Similar	bargaining	could	be	envisaged	for	EU	
pension	liabilities	and	assets.
Best	guess?	Around	€30	billion.
By Iain Begg
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During	the	referendum	campaign,	the	main	
debate	around	public	finances	was	about	
whether	leaving	the	EU	would	release	£350	
million	a	week	to	be	spent	on	the	NHS.	Even	on	
the	most	favourable	assumptions,	the	claim	–	
which	influenced	many	voters	–	was	repeatedly 
shown	to	be	exaggerated.	There	were	also	
concerns	that	any	downturn	in	the	economy	as	
a	result	of	Brexit	would	reduce	tax	revenues in a 
way	that	could	worsen	the	UK	fiscal	position.
The	EU’s	finances	are	set	in	a	seven-year	
Multiannual	Financial	Framework	(MFF),	
currently	covering	2014-20	and	formally	enacted	
in	a	2013	Council	Regulation.	The	MFF	is	a	hard	
fought	bargain,	invariably	agreed	after	much	
acrimony	and	brinkmanship.	As	with	many	EU	
accords,	the	ministers	concerned	usually	claim	
victory	at	home,	while	bemoaning	in	Brussels	
how	much	they	have	conceded.	The	advantage	
of	the	seven-year	deal	is	in	allowing	the	
annual	budget	to	proceed	relatively	smoothly,	
precisely	because	the	MFF	is	where	all	the	big	
compromises	are	settled.	
What has changed since the referendum?
The	subsequent	emergence	of	the	“divorce	bill”	
rapidly	became	a	new	and	potentially	divisive	
issue	in	the	Brexit	negotiations.	It	arises	mainly	
because	many	EU	programmes,	principally	for	
research	and	for	EU	regional	policy,	are	multi-
annual	in	character.	In	both	cases,	the	aim	is	to	
avoid	piecemeal	projects	and	to	look	instead	for	
coherent	programmes	delivering	results	greater	
than	the	sum	of	the	parts.	It	does,	however,	mean	
that	contracts	signed	in	one	financial	year	will	
often	not	fall	due	for	final	payment	until	several	
years	later	–	known	in	EU	circles	as	RAL,	from	the	
French	expression	reste	à	liquider.
Against	this	backdrop,	the	departure	of	the	UK	
(assuming	April	2019),	will	be	seven	quarters	
before	the	end	of	the	MFF.	An	immediate	end	
to	British	payments	would	leave	a	hole	in	the	
budget	that	would	have	to	be	filled	by	other	
member	states.	For	the	likes	of	Germany	or	the	
Netherlands,	the	additional	payments	would	be	
manageable,	but	the	political	fallout	would	be	
open	to	exploitation	by	anti-EU	populists.	Others,	
such	as	Greece,	Italy,	Spain	or	even	France,	already	
struggling	to	consolidate	their	public	finances,	
would	need	to	make	cuts	in	other	spending	
programmes	at	a	time	when	austerity	is	already	
having	damaging	political	effects.
What happens next?
A	financial	settlement	has	been	put	forward	as	one	
of	three	key	areas	on	which	the	EU	side	wants	to	
see	significant	early	progress.	Reports	suggest	the	
demand	from	the	EU	could	exceed	€100	billion,	
SIXTEEN
3736
PART FOUR: BREXIT AND THE ECONOMY
Introduction
What	form	of	relationship	to	have	with	the	EU	
after	Brexit	is	the	key	economic	policy	issue	facing	
the	UK.	This	election	was	meant	to	give	the	prime	
minister	a	strong	mandate	for	a	“hard	Brexit”.	
The	Conservative	Party	and	the	DUP,	whose	
support	will	be	necessary	to	allow	Theresa	May	
to	continue	as	prime	minister,	agree	on	the	main	
elements	of	UK’s	future	economic	relationship	
with	the	EU.	They	want	to	leave	the	Single	Market	
and	the	Customs	Union,	and	they	don’t	want	to	
be	subject	to	the	jurisdiction	by	the	European	
Court	of	Justice.	Both,	in	this	sense,	support	a	
“hard”	Brexit.	Now	that	the	DUP	is	supporting	the	
government,	however,	there	are	a	couple	of	new	
priorities	for	the	Conservative	Party,	not	least	
deciding	on	replacements	for	the	income	support	
that	the	EU	provides	to	the	farming	sector,	which	
is	important	for	Northern	Ireland.	
Softly, softly? 
Broadly	though,	while	both	parties	in	the	ruling	
coalition	agree	on	the	plan	for	Brexit,	the	
inconclusive	election	result	means	that	a	hard	
Brexit	looks	far	less	certain.	The	press,	for	its	part,	
has	never	been	more	sceptical	of	this	path.	
One	reason	for	this	is	that	the	seat	share	of	MPs	
from	pro-Remain	Scotland	in	the	Conservative	
party	has	increased,	which	could	soften	the	
government’s	previous	stance	of	“no	deal	is	
better	than	a	bad	deal”.	Another	reason	is	the	
way	this	general	election	result	will	change	
the	public	discourse	on	economic	policy.	Early	
estimates	are	that	the	turnout	of	young	people	
between	18	to	24	years	increased	from	about	
40%	in	2015	to	70%.	Young	people	tend	to	
be	much	more	pro-Remain	than	older	voters,	
so	a	hard	Brexit	would	ignore	the	wishes	of	a	
newly	mobilised	electorate.	In	addition,	the	
Remain-Leave	divide	seems	to	have	been	a	
factor	underlying	which	constituencies	swung	to	
and	from	the	Conservative	party	in	this	general	
election,	with	the	Government	performing	
particularly	badly	in	pro-Remain	urban	and	
southern	constituencies	(see	the	contribution	
by	John	Curtice).	The	election	results	have	
undermined	the	plans	of	the	Conservative	party,	
which	stood	on	the	platform	of	a	strong	and	
stable	leadership	in	the	Brexit	negotiations.	
The economics of Brexit 
The	White	Paper	on	Brexit	prioritises	immigration	
controls	and	commits	to	leaving	the	Single	
Market	and	the	Customs	Union,	while	the	prime	
minister	continues	to	reaffirm	that	“no	deal	is	
better	than	a	bad	deal.”	There	is	near	consensus 
among	economists	that	the	hard	–	or	chaotic	–	
form	of	Brexit	that	this	implies	would	hurt	the	UK	
economy.	Although	there	was	little	immediate	
economic	fallout	from	the	Brexit	vote,	in	the	
first	quarter	of	this	year	UK	economic	growth	
was	the	slowest	of	any	EU	economy.	The	modest	
recovery	in	real	wage	that	started	in	2014	has	
been	eroded	by	the	higher	price	inflation	from	
the	depreciation	of	the	pound	since	the	Brexit	
vote.	Young	workers	between	the	ages	of	18	and	
21	have	seen	the	biggest	declines	in	real	weekly	
earnings,	which	for	them	have	fallen	by	16%	since	
the	global	financial	crisis	in	2008.	
All	this	will	put	pressure	on	the	government	to	
soften	its	approach,	perhaps	seeking	an	extension	
of	the	2-year	trigger	period	or	a	quick	transition	
deal	that	maintains	single	market	membership	
for	an	extended	period.	This	would	avoid	the	“cliff	
edge”	scenario	of	a	no	deal,	which	would	mean	
that	the	UK	reverts	to	World	Trade	Organization	
(WTO)	membership	without	a	special	deal	with	
the	EU	on	the	free	movement	of	goods,	services,	
people	and	investments.	Were	this	to	happen,	
it	is	estimated	it	would	reduce	GDP	in	the	UK	by	
about	3%	per	year	due	to	higher	trade	barriers	
with	the	EU.
We	also	have	more	to	learn	about	how	the	
Remain-Leave	divide	shifted	party	affiliations	and	
the	role	played	by	the	very	different	approaches	
to	economic	policy	set	out	by	each	party.	
Certainly,	the	rhetoric	of	a	low-tax,	Singapore-
style	economy	that	many	hard	Brexiteers	dream	
of	looks	increasingly	distant	from	the	UK	centre	
of	political	gravity.	In	turbulent	political	times,	
future	economic	policy	is	hard	to	predict.	
The	only	certainty	is	that	the	real	economic	
challenge	remains	–	how	to	reverse	the	decades	
of	economic	stagnation	that	has	changed	the	
political	landscape	of	the	UK?	There	are	several	
policy	proposals	to	address	these	challenges	and	
many	have	broad	political	support.	Hopefully,	
they	will	become	a	central	issue	in	the	next	
election.	
By Swati Dhingra
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In	contrast,	many	environmental	groups	are	
concerned	that	the	loss	of	European	support	
for	environmental	conservation	endangers	our	
countryside	(see	environment	section).	They	are	
calling	for	political	commitments	to	preserve	and	
enhance	incentives	that	provide	public	goods,	
such	as	the	maintenance	of	traditional	landscapes,	
wildlife	habitats	for	both	plants	and	animals,	and	
high-quality	water,	air	and	soil.	UK	consumer	
groups	have	not,	so	far,	articulated	any	concerns	
about	rising	food	prices	or	the	potential	threats	
to	food	quality	and	standards	from	freer	trade	
with	the	rest	of	the	world.	The	political	bargaining	
between	these	interest	groups	has	yet	to	begin,	
since	no	one	is	at	all	clear	about	what	the	future	
might	bring.
The future
There	will	clearly	be	major	political	debates	
about	the	need	for	continued	taxpayer	support	
for	farmers	and	the	role	of	the	Government	in	
protecting	our	environment	and	ensuring	the	
safety	and	quality	of	our	food	supplies	(including	
the	regulation	of	inputs	such	as	hormone	
treatment	of	beef	and	genetically	modified	crops).
There	are	also	concerns	about:	
i)	 Immigration:	Parts	of	the	agricultural	and	
food	sectors	(especially	horticulture,	livestock	
processing	and	retailing)	are	heavily	dependent	
on	migrant	labour	from	the	EU.	
ii)	Trading	relations:	The	sector	is	already	nervous	
about	the	extent	to	which	agricultural	trade	
will	be	sacrificed	to	obtain	preferential	trade	
agreements	with	non-EU	countries.	Many	of	
these	countries	may	regard	access	to	the	UK	
food	market	as	a	valuable	benefit	to	offset	
increased	UK	access	to	their	industrial	and	
services	markets.
The	uncertainty	that	surrounds	the	terms	of	
negotiations	with	the	EU	have	made	farmers	and	
Introduction
The	referendum	campaigns	made	much	of	the	
UK’s	payments	to	the	EU	and	of	how	much	the	
UK	Government	could	save	if	we	left.	There	was,	
however,	very	little	debate	on	the	EU	spending	on	
agriculture,	other	than	claims	that	we	could,	after	
a	Brexit	vote,	achieve	the	same	ends	much	more	
efficiently,	and	with	substantially	less	regulation.	
EU	spending	on	the	Common	Agricultural	
Policy	(CAP)	peaked	in	the	mid-1980s	at	73%	
of	the	total	EU	spend,	declining	to	about	40%	
today.	This	followed	major	reforms	of	the	
policy	to	substantially	reduce	tariff	protection	
and	distortion	of	international	markets.	
These	reforms	were	fully	supported	by	UK	
governments,	which	have	been	highly	critical	of	
the	CAP	since	we	joined	the	European	Economic	
Community	in	1973.	The	current	annual	
payments	to	farmers	(totalling	£2.5bn	per	year	
to	the	UK)	are	the	remnants	of	the	protectionist	
CAP.	A	further	£0.8bn	per	year	is	spent	in	the	UK	
under	the	CAP	for	environmental	conservation	
and	rural	development	schemes.	These	
payments	(£3.3bn	per	year)	form	the	major	part	
(90%)	of	the	financial	benefit	to	the	UK	of	EU	
membership,	offset	by	the	UK’s	contribution	to	
the	rest	of	EU	spending	(which	has	also	been	
subject	to	the	controversial	UK	rebate	from	the	
EU).	
Since the referendum
While	there	have	been	reports	that	the	majority	
of	farmers	favoured	Brexit,	we	have	found	no	
compelling	evidence	of	this.	On	the	one	hand,	it	
is	clear	that	CAP	payments	are	currently	a	major	
part	of	the	incomes	earned	from	farming,	leading	
to	government	commitments	to	maintain	these	
payments.	The	Conservative	manifesto	pledges	
to	continue	these	payments	to	the	end	of	the	
next	parliament	(2022).	On	the	other	hand,	many	
in	the	industry	believe	that	these	payments	are	
distorting	land	values	and	rents	(and	possibly	
other	capital	and	input	costs	as	well),	thus	making	
it	more	difficult	for	farmers	to	enter	the	industry	
and	expand	their	businesses.	Meanwhile,	the	
increasing	tendency	to	make	the	farm	payments	
conditional	on	“greening”	measures	(e.g.	the	
three-crop	rule	which	requires	farmers	with	
more	than	30	hectares	of	arable	land	to	grow	at	
least	three	crops)	and	the	increase	in	red	tape	in	
general	irritates	some	farmers,	who	feel	that	a	
British	agricultural	policy	would	be	preferable.	
The	depreciation	of	sterling	since	the	referendum	
has	helped	our	agricultural	exporters	and	may	
have	boosted	farm	prices,	encouraging	some	
farmers	to	believe	that	they	can	survive	Brexit.	
Equally,	however,	a	weaker	pound	has	made	
imports	more	expensive	and	increased	costs	
across	the	supply	chain.	
rural	communities	very	anxious.	They	fear	that	the	
end	of	subsidies	could	have	a	devastating	impact	
on	their	livelihoods	and	on	the	industry	as	a	
whole.	In	the	short	term,	farmers	may	experience	
a	reduction	in	farm	incomes,	but	there	are	
those	who	maintain	that	the	effects	of	Brexit	on	
agricultural	output	and	farmers’	incomes	may	not	
be	as	severe	as	expected,	at	least	in	the	medium	
and	long	run.	What	will	happen	after	2022,	
however,	is	not	at	all	clear.	
There	are	major	questions	to	be	answered:	
•	 Should	farm	subsidies	continue?	
•	 Should	farmers	be	supported	on	the	basis	of	the	
public	goods	they	provide	beyond	food	–	their	
input	to	landscape	management,	biodiversity,	
soil	and	water	quality,	and	carbon	storage?	
•	 If	so,	should	that	be	via	public	subsidy,	private	
investment	or	both?	
•	 Finally,	what	kind	of	agricultural	governance	is	
needed?	
While	there	is	little	doubt	that	UK	agriculture	
will	survive	and	could	even	prosper	without	CAP	
support,	the	transition	may	be	painful	and	will	
affect	all	farmers	and	related	businesses	in	rural	
Britain.
by Carmen Hubbard, David Harvey 
and Anne Liddon
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that	information	continues	to	be	fully	available	in	
the	public	domain.	However,	there	seems	to	be	
little	appetite	in	government	for	such	legislation	
or	for	a	wide-ranging	debate	about	the	future	
of	environmental	governance.	The	25-year	plan	
on	the	UK’s	Natural	Environment,	first	promised	
in	2015,	is	still	to	appear,	although	it	remained	a	
manifesto	commitment	for	the	Conservative	Party	
in	2017.	
What will happen?
There	is	a	significant	possibility	that	UK	
environmental	policy	will	be	weaker	post	Brexit.	
Take	air	quality.	There	is	an	ongoing	legal	action	
against	the	Government	for	its	failure	properly	to	
implement	EU	laws	on	air	quality.	The	activist	legal	
group	Client	Earth	has	taken	the	Government	to	
court	over	the	issue.	Outside	the	EU,	such	groups	
will	have	less	leverage	over	the	Government.	
The	Conservative	2017	manifesto	has	some	
vague	mentions	of	air	quality	but	few	concrete	
commitments	to	implement	the	current	plan	or	to	
maintain	EU	standards	post	Brexit.
Brexit	raises	other,	equally	profound,	questions	
about	the	governance	of	the	UK	environment.	
For	example,	there	is	scope	for	much	greater	
fragmentation	of	UK	environmental	policy	as	the	
environment	is	a	fully	devolved	matter.	Currently,	
EU	directives	set	a	minimum	level	of	protection	
but	member	states	–	or	devolved	bodies	–	can	set	
higher	standards	if	they	so	choose.	Thus,	Scotland	
and	Wales	have	more	ambitious	climate	policies	
than	England.	Post	Brexit,	different	policies	are	
more	likely	to	emerge	across	the	four	nations	of	
the	UK	–	unless,	that	is,	an	agreement	is	struck	to	
establish	minimum	standards.	Determining	who	
decides	those	standards,	and	their	level,	will	be	
politically	challenging.
Brexit,	therefore,	has	profound	implications	for	
environmental	policy.	The	immediate	outlook	
suggests	some	policy	continuity,	not	least	because	
much	environmental	policy	is	underpinned	by	
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The	EU	has	had	a	profound	impact	on	UK	
environmental	policy.	In	the	1980s,	the	UK	was	
derided	as	the	“dirty	man	of	Europe”.	Today,	it	is	a	
global	climate	leader	and	has	successfully	exported	
its	own	pragmatic,	evidence-informed	style	of	
policy	making	to	the	EU	level.	Yet	despite	this,	the	
environment	barely	featured	as	an	issue	during	the	
EU	referendum	campaign.	After	sustained	pressure	
from	the	large	non-governmental	organisations	
(NGOs),	Prime	Minister	Cameron	belatedly	made	
an	environmental	case	for	voting	Remain,	but	Vote	
Leave	steered	clear	of	the	issue.	Consequently,	
even	though	the	Department	for	Environment,	
Food	&	Rural	Affairs	(DEFRA)	stood	to	be	among	
the	Ministries	most	heavily	affected	by	a	vote	to	
leave,	the	environment	was	one	of	the	campaign’s	
“Cinderella”	issues,	gaining	limited	public	or	media	
attention.
What has happened since the referendum?
Since	the	referendum,	there	has	been	a	growing	
realisation	in	the	environment	and	business	
sectors	that	Brexit	will	have	profound	implications	
for	environmental	policies,	including	those	on	
agriculture,	fisheries,	climate	and	energy.	The	
Government	has	committed	to	“cutting	and	
pasting”	EU	environmental	rules	into	the	UK	
statute	book	via	the	Great	Repeal	Bill	(see	the	
section	on	the	Great	Repeal	Bill)	to	prevent	any	
regulatory	holes	emerging	when	the	UK	leaves	the	
EU.	The	Government	claims	that	once	outside	the	
EU,	individual	policies	will	be	reviewed	and	it	will	
be	up	to	Parliament	to	decide	which	to	remove,	
amend	or	leave	as	they	are.	
However,	it	was	acknowledged	by	Andrea	
Leadsom,	former	Secretary	of	State	for	the	
Environment,	Food	and	Rural	Affairs,	that	a	third	
of	EU	environmental	policy	cannot	simply	be	
copied	into	UK	law.	In	many	cases,	EU	law	makes	
reference	to	EU	institutions	(such	as	provisions	
for	reporting	to	the	European	Commission	
on	water	quality).	It	remains	unclear	whether	
the	UK	will	develop	alternative	governance	
arrangements	and	whether,	in	devolved	areas	such	
as	the	environment,	these	will	be	centralised	or	
devolved.
The	House	of	Commons	Environmental	Audit	
Committee	(EAC)	has	also	underlined	the	risk	of	
“zombie	legislation”,	alive	on	the	statute	book	but	
effectively	dead	for	want	of	mechanisms	to	secure	
its	updating	and	implementation,	with	possibly	
negative	consequences	for	environmental	quality.	
The	EAC	has	called	for	a	new	Environmental	
Protection	Act	to	ensure	that	the	environment	is	
adequately	monitored,	that	policy	is	enforced	and	
product	standards	that	are	likely	to	remain	in	
place	to	enable	UK	firms	to	continue	to	trade	
with	the	EU.	However,	whilst	the	Government	
has	paid	lip	service	to	maintaining	the	EU’s	
environmental	rules,	its	general	state	of	readiness	
to	cope	with	Brexit	has	been	described	as	
“worryingly	complacent”	by	the	House	of	Lords.	
Their	Lordships	were	particularly	exercised	by	the	
Government’s	apparent	unwillingness	to	engage	
with	deeper	questions,	such	as	how	rules	will	be	
properly	implemented	and	enforced	outside	the	
EU’s	environmental	governance	structures.	The	
reduced	capacity	of	DEFRA,	coupled	with	the	
closure	of	the	Department	for	Energy	and	Climate	
Change	further	suggests	that	environmental	
policy	innovation	is	likely	to	be	rather	limited.	
For	example,	opinion	polls	show	that	the	public	
support	the	adoption	of	a	Clean	Air	Act,	but	only	
Labour	and	the	Green	Party	were	committed	to	
introduce	one	in	their	election	manifestos.	One	
possible	outcome	of	Brexit,	then,	is	increased	
party	competition	over	environmental	issues.	
Another	outcome	is	increased	mobilisation	on	
environmental	issues	by	public	campaigning	
groups.	For	example,	the	Greener	UK	campaign	
has	brought	together	environmental	NGOs	
to	campaign	for	new,	post-Brexit	national	
legislation	that	is	more	ambitious	than	current	
EU	environmental	protections.	There	is	certainly	
scope	in	a	post-Brexit	world	to	develop	policies	
that	are	more	sensitive	to	local	conditions,	and	
to	build	upon	Britain’s	reputation	for	leadership	
in	key	fields	like	climate	change.	Delivering	these	
goals	will,	however,	require	ambition	and	vision.	
By Charlotte Burns, Viviane Gravey  
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Introduction
The	Brexit	vote	was	about	taking	back	control.	
It	had	been	given	up	at	UK	level	by	the	elegant	
but	terse	European	Communities	Act	(ECA)	
1972.	This	Act	gave	supremacy	to	EU	law	where	
it	conflicted	with	UK	law	(i.e.	EU	law	took	
precedence	over	UK	law)	and	mandated	British	
judges	to	follow	judgments	of	the	Court	of	
Justice.	Brexit	requires	this	Act	to	be	repealed.	
This	will	be	done	by	the	Great	Repeal	Bill	(GRB),	
which	will	also	make	provision	for	the	many	
thousands	of	technical	changes	that	delivering	
Brexit	will	require.	The	GRB,	in	other	words,	aims	
to	deliver	at	the	domestic	level	the	results	of	the	
Article	50	negotiations	in	Brussels,	as	well	as	the	
changes	to	UK	constitutional	law	needed	to	give	
effect	to	Brexit.	Most	lawyers	accept	that	a	Bill	
along	the	lines	of	the	GRB	is	necessary,	although	
Jeremy	Corbyn,	the	leader	of	the	Labour	party,	
has	indicated	that	the	Prime	Minister’s	plans	to	
complete	Brexit	through	a	“Great	Repeal	Bill”	were	
“history”	and	would	have	to	be	dropped,	without	
providing	clarity	as	to	what	he	would	do	instead.
The	GRB	has	not	yet	been	published.	However,	a	
white	paper	is	available	and	what	follows	is	taken	
from	that.	It	is	primarily	about	preparing	the	UK	
legal	system	for	Brexit.	It	is	not	a	vehicle	for	major	
policy	changes	(which	will	be	delivered	by	other	
pieces	of	legislation).	The	white	paper	makes	
clear	that	the	intention	of	the	GRB	is	to	ensure	a	
“smooth	and	orderly	Brexit	that	commands	the	
confidence	of	all”.	In	other	words,	to	reassure	
employers,	workers	and	consumers	that,	as	far	as	
possible,	the	same	laws	and	rules	will	apply	the	
day	after	Brexit	day	as	the	day	before.	Specifically,	
the	GRB	has	three	aims:
• Repeal	the	ECA
• Convert	EU	law	into	national	law
• Correct	UK	law	to	deliver	a	functioning	statute	
book
Repeal
The	first	and	most	important	aim	of	the	GRB	is	
to	repeal	the	ECA,	thus	making	UK	law,	not	EU	
law,	supreme.	This	part	of	the	GRB	will	come	
into	force	on	the	day	the	UK	leaves	the	EU.	The	
GRB	will	end	the	general	supremacy	of	EU	law:	
“newer	legislation	[passed	by	Parliament	post	
Brexit]	will	take	precedence	over	the	EU-derived	
law	we	have	preserved”.	But	if,	after	exit,	a	conflict	
arises	between	two	pre-exit	laws,	one	of	which	
is	EU-derived	and	the	other	not,	then	the	EU-
derived	law	will	continue	to	take	precedence	
over	the	other	UK	law.	In	other	words,	a	degree	
of	supremacy	is	preserved,	albeit	one	that	can	be	
corrected	by	an	Act	of	the	UK	Parliament.
Convert
The	second	aim	of	the	GRB	is	to	convert	the	whole	
corpus	of	EU	law	into	national	law.	In	essence,	the	
GRB	will	take	a	snapshot	of	all	EU	law	and	ensure	
it	all	becomes	part	of	UK	law	on	Brexit	day.	This	is	
why	some	refer	to	it	at	the	“Great	Cut	and	Paste	
Bill”.
In	fact,	the	reality	is	somewhat	more	complex.	
Take	Directives,	for	example.	The	UK	has	had	to	
implement	Directives,	usually	within	two	years	
of	their	adoption.	Some	Directives	have	been	
implemented	by	an	Act	of	Parliament,	like	the	
Equality	Directives,	which	were	implemented	by	
the	Equality	Act	2010.	They	will	be	unaffected	by	
the	GRB.	Others,	like	the	Working	Time	Directive,	
have	been	implemented	through	“Statutory	
Instruments”	(SIs)	–	secondary	law	in	the	UK	–	
using	powers	conferred	on	the	executive	(the	
government	and	the	civil	service)	by	provisions	in	
the	ECA.	Once	the	ECA	is	repealed,	all	these	SIs	
would	disappear.	However,	the	GRB	will	ensure	
they	continue	to	have	legal	effect.
Another	type	of	EU	law,	Regulations,	of	which	
there	are	around	12,000,	will	also	have	to	be	
incorporated	into	UK	law.	This	will	largely	be	done	
simply	by	referring	to	them	in	the	GRB,	rather	than	
copying	and	pasting	them	into	it.
The	case	law	of	the	Court	of	Justice	is	also	a	key	
part	of	EU	law.	The	GRB	will	ensure	that	pre-Brexit	
case	law	will	continue	to	be	binding	on	the	UK	
courts.	It	will	have	the	same	precedent	status	
as	decisions	of	the	UK’s	own	Supreme	Court.	In	
exceptional	circumstances,	the	Supreme	Court	can	
reverse	those	decisions.	After	Brexit,	Parliament	
too	will	be	able	to	reverse	those	decisions.	When	
it	comes	to	post-Brexit	case	law,	the	GRB	will	
“not	require	domestic	courts	to	consider	CJEU’s	
jurisprudence”.	But	it	is	likely	to	have	“persuasive”	
effect	(i.e.	the	judges	will	take	it	into	account).
Correct
The	third	and	most	controversial	aspect	of	the	
GRB	will	be	the	powers	to	“correct”	the	UK	statute	
book.	These	will	take	the	form	of	“Henry	VIII	
powers”.	These	are	powers	given	to	the	executive	
to	amend	UK	primary	and	secondary	law	using	
Statutory	Instruments.	The	use	of	these	powers	
is	necessary	to	deliver	Brexit	in	the	two-year	
timeframe	(and	so	will	have	to	be	brought	into	
force	prior	to	Brexit	day),	but	are	controversial	
because	Parliament	does	not	have	much	chance	
to	scrutinise	the	legislation.	These	powers	will	be	
used	to	make	technical	changes	to	the	law	(e.g.	
removing	references	to	EU	law	and	institutions),	
but	they	will	also	be	used	to	deal	with	issues	that	
arise	during	the	negotiations.	In	other	words,	the	
Henry	VIII	powers	in	the	GRB	will	be	used	to	fix	the	
plane	while	it	is	still	flying.	Hold	on	to	your	hats.
By Catherine Barnard
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a	“hard	Brexit”.	And	this	is	despite	the	fact	that	
it	was,	and	is,	far	from	clear	that	this	position	
commanded	a	majority	either	in	Parliament	or	in	
the	country.	While	public	opinion	is	broadly	hostile	
to	free	movement,	it	remains	split	on	whether	
or	not	free	movement	is	an	acceptable	price	to	
pay	for	preserving	other	aspects	of	Single	Market	
membership.	
Paradoxically,	the	clarity	of	this	specific	decision	
has	thrown	almost	every	other	element	of	the	
UK	immigration	system	into	doubt.	Among	
the	fundamental	questions	on	which	the	UK	
Government	(and	the	official	opposition)	currently	
does	not	have	anything	resembling	a	clear	policy	
are:
•	 When	will	free	movement	end?	
•	 Should	EU	citizens	continue	to	enjoy	preferential	
status	in	the	new	system?	
•	 Will	the	new	system	have	preferential	or	special	
treatment	for	specific	sectors	(or	indeed	nations	
or	regions)?	
•	 Will	policy	be	set	primarily	with	respect	to	the	
economic	needs	of	the	UK	or	by	reference	to	
an	arbitrary	and	largely	discredited	numerical	
target?			
Meanwhile,	one	issue	that	has	risen	sharply	up	the	
agenda	since	the	vote	is	the	status	of	EU	nationals	
resident	in	the	UK	(and	Brits	living	elsewhere	
in	the	EU).	It	quickly	became	apparent	that	the	
promises	from	Vote	Leave	that	these	groups	had	
nothing	to	worry	about	were	either	ignorant,	
deceptive	or	both.	Equally,	the	prime	minister	
claimed	that	this	issue	would	be	easily	resolved	
once	the	EU27	set	out	their	position.	They	have	
now	done	so	but,	before	the	election,	were	met	
with	a	deafening	silence	from	the	UK	side.	
What next?
In	the	short	term,	the	most	salient	political	issue	
is	likely	to	be	citizens’	rights,	since	an	acceptable	
Introduction
If	the	UK’s	vote	to	leave	the	EU	was	a	vote	for,	or	
more	specifically	against,	anything,	it	was	a	vote	
against	free	movement	of	workers	within	the	EU.	
Polling	evidence	showed	that	approximately	80%	
of	those	who	thought	that	immigration	was	mostly	
a	force	for	good	voted	to	Remain,	while	a	similar	
proportion	of	those	who	thought	it	was	a	force	for	
ill	voted	to	Leave.		
The	slogan,	“Vote	Leave,	Take	Control”,	summed	
up	the	entire	Leave	campaign.	However,	it	was	
particularly	effective	with	respect	to	immigration	
policy	and	border	control,	because	it	contained	a	
large	element	of	truth.	Free	movement	of	workers	
is	one	of	the	foundational	“four	freedoms”	of	
the	EU.	Consequently,	the	Remain	campaign	
found	it	extremely	difficult	to	counter	the	simple	
argument	that	the	only	way	for	the	UK	to	“control”	
immigration	was	to	leave.	
Other	claims	made	by	the	Leave	campaign	with	
respect	to	free	movement	–	in	particular,	that	EU	
migrants	drove	down	wages,	reduced	employment	
prospects	for	British	workers	or	were	responsible	
for	reduced	access	to	public	services	–	were	at	
best	exaggerated	and	often	simply	unsupported	by	
the	evidence.	However,	because	of	the	perceived	
advantage	of	the	Leave	side	on	the	immigration	
issue,	the	Remain	campaign	largely	avoided	the	
topic.  
Meanwhile,	one	issue	that	received	little	high-
level	political	attention	during	the	campaign	was	
the	future	of	EU	citizens	resident	in	the	UK,	and	
of	Britons	elsewhere	in	the	EU	(see	the	section	
on	the	latter);	broadly,	Vote	Leave’s	claims	that	
“nothing	will	change”	for	people	in	the	situation	
was	not	challenged,	except	by	legal	experts.
What has happened since the referendum?
A	few	lines	in	one	speech	–	Theresa	May’s	speech	
to	Conservative	Party	conference	in	October	2016	
–	set	the	parameters	of	the	political	debate	not	
just	on	immigration	but	on	Brexit	more	broadly.	
By	saying	“we	are	not	leaving	the	European	Union	
only	to	give	up	control	over	immigration	again”,	
she	essentially	decided,	unilaterally,	that	Brexit	
meant	not	only	leaving	the	political	structure	
of	the	EU,	but	also	the	Single	Market,	given	the	
EU’s	insistence	that	there	is	no	scope	for	“cherry-
picking”	different	elements	of	the	Single	Market.	
So,	the	prime	minister’s	position	on	immigration	
has,	up	until	now,	been	by	far	the	most	important	
factor	behind	the	UK’s	current	course	towards	
resolution	is	an	essential	element	of	an	Article	
50	deal.	Alongside	the	“divorce	bill”,	the	extent	
to	which	the	UK	Government	is	prepared	to	
compromise	on	this	issue	–	which,	for	the	EU,	
must	involve	some	continued	elements	of	
“European”	law	holding	sway	in	the	UK	for	an	
extended	period	–	will	be	a	key	signal	of	whether	
an	ultimate	deal	is	possible.	
Assuming	this	is	resolved,	the	focus	of	political	
debate	is	likely	to	move	back	to	the	trade-off	
between	freedom	of	movement	and	the	Single	
Market,	which	Theresa	May	thought	she	had	
resolved	last	October.		Paradoxically,	despite	the	
fact	that	both	main	parties	committed	in	principle	
to	ending	freedom	of	movement,	the	inconclusive	
result	of	the	election	means	that	the	government’s	
approach	to	Brexit	is	called	into	question.	
Labour’s	stance	–	supporting	both	the	end	of	
free	movement	and	the	continued	“benefits	of	
the	Single	Market”	–	was	both	confused	and	
contradictory,	but	does	not	entirely	preclude	the	
possibility	of	continued	membership	of	the	Single	
Market,	perhaps	with	some	modest	amendments	
to	the	current	free	movement	rules.	More	broadly,	
the	election	result	also	calls	into	question	the	
Conservative	Party’s	(uncosted)	pledge	to	reduce	
immigration	to	the	“tens	of	thousands”,	which	is	
highly	unpopular	with	business.	
Much	will	depend	on	economic	developments.	
Up	until	now,	the	debate	about	Brexit,	free	
movement	and	immigration	has	been	against	the	
background	of	a	relatively	robust	economy	and	
labour	market,	and	high	immigration.	If,	as	seems	
plausible,	the	economy	slows	significantly,	and	net	
migration	–	particularly	from	the	EU	–	falls	sharply,	
then	the	trade-offs	noted	above	will	appear	
very	different,	and	the	political	dynamics	may	
change	significantly,	opening	up	space	for	a	more	
economically	liberal	approach	to	immigration	both	
from	within	and	outside	the	EU.		
By  Jonathan Portes
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this	foundational	right	of	EU	membership	will	also	
have	consequences	for	EU	nationals	making	Britain	
their	home.	October	2016	saw	the	establishment	
of	the	All-Party	Parliamentary	Group	on	Freedom	
of	Movement,	a	forum	emphasising	the	value	of	
freedom	of	movement	to	the	British	economy	and	
British	society,	as	well	as	the	rights	of	EU	citizens	
living	in	Britain	and	Britons	resident	in	other	EU	
member	states.
The	general	election	has	caused	further	disquiet	
among	British	overseas	residents	about	the	right	
to	vote.	The	Government	issued	a	white	paper	
in	October	2016	outlining	its	plans	to	legislate	to	
grant	lifetime	voting	rights	to	individual	British	
citizens	who	had	previously	been	registered	to	
vote.	However,	this	had	not	become	policy	before	
the	general	election.	
British	pensioners	living	abroad	have	also	
continued	to	make	the	headlines.	While	claims	
about	what	their	return	might	cost	the	NHS	
continue	to	be	made,	concerns	about	what	
might	happen	to	pensions	paid	abroad	have	also	
surfaced.	Simply	put,	while	current	arrangements	
allow	for	Britons	living	in	the	EU	to	receive	pension	
increases	in	line	with	inflation,	withdrawal	from	
the	EU	might	entail	the	end	of	this	reciprocal	
arrangement.	This	could	result	in	the	freezing	of	
pensions	and	hence	a	real-term	reduction	in	the	
incomes	these	pensioners	receive.	
The	lack	of	clarity	about	what	Brexit	might	mean	
for	Britain	also	affects	British	populations	abroad.	
This	uncertainty	is	profound	and	is	causing	
significant	unease.	
The future for Britons abroad
The	end	of	free	movement	will	undoubtedly	
impact	on	who	can	migrate	to,	and	who	can	
continue	to	live	and	work	in	EU	member	states.	
It	is	possible	that	one	response	to	Brexit	might	
be	repatriation,	particularly	of	those	populations	
Introduction
Freedom	of	movement	–	the	right	to	live,	work	and	
access	welfare	arrangements	in	another	European	
Union	member	state	–	is	one	of	the	founding	
principles	of	the	EU.	Freedom	of	movement	
became	a	central	theme	for	the	Leave	campaign.	
Playing	to	public	concerns	about	high	levels	of	
migration,	they	argued	that	stopping	freedom	of	
movement	was	critical	to	curbing	these	flows.	
An	estimated	3	million	European	citizens	are	
resident	in	Great	Britain,	while	the	latest	figures	
suggest	that	there	are	1.2	million	Britons	living	
elsewhere	in	the	EU.	The	latter	represent	a	
diverse	population	that	includes	those	working,	
studying	and	retiring	abroad.	Just	as	for	their	EU	
counterparts	living	in	Britain,	Brexit	might	bring	
about	a	significant	transformation	in	the	lives	of	
these	British	migrants	as	their	political	rights	and	
social	and	financial	entitlements	are	renegotiated.	
Britons abroad and the EU referendum
In	the	run-up	to	the	referendum,	Britain’s	
expatriates	featured	in	two	prominent	ways.	First,	
in	that	those	who	had	lived	overseas	for	15	years	
or	more	found	themselves	ineligible	to	vote.	
Second,	because	of	the	potential	consequences	
of	large-scale	repatriation.	The	inability	to	vote	
in	a	referendum	that	could	have	such	profound	
consequences	for	their	daily	lives	reinvigorated	
the	question	of	overseas	voting	rights	for	
British	citizens,	sparking	political	mobilisation	
and	campaigning	among	Britons	living	abroad	
around	a	“vote	for	life”.	On	the	other	hand,	
Britain’s	expatriates	were	depicted	as	a	social	
problem	waiting	to	happen.	The	prospect	that	
elderly	British	pensioners	currently	living	in	other	
European	countries	might	be	forced	to	return	
promoted	concerns	that	Brexit	might	place	further	
pressure	on	an	already	strained	National	Health	
Service.	
These	headlines	paint	only	a	partial	picture.	The	
British	populations	living	elsewhere	in	the	EU	are	
a	more	diverse	group	than	a	focus	on	pensioners	
suggests.	Similarly	varied	are	the	motivations	
for	their	emigration.	These	include	work,	study	
and	family	reunion.	Freedom	of	movement	may	
facilitate	such	migrations,	but	is	not	the	only	thing	
that	enables	the	migration	and	settlement	of	
individual	migrants.	
One year on…
Freedom	of	movement	does	not	unilaterally	affect	
British	populations	living	in	Europe;	the	removal	of	
made	more	vulnerable	as	a	consequence.	If	this	
transpires,	proper	planning	will	be	necessary	not	
merely	in	terms	of	the	potential	costs	in	relation	
to	health	and	social	care,	but	also	with	regard	to	
how	the	reintegration	of	these	people	into	British	
society	will	be	facilitated.	Absent	repatriation,	
it	is	important	that	clarity	is	provided	as	soon	
as	possible	as	to	what	Britons	living	in	other	EU	
member	states	will	need	to	do	to	continue	their	
residence.	
These	are	just	some	of	the	questions	we	might	
consider.	Looking	forward,	it	is	important	to	
carefully	attend	to	how	Britain’s	withdrawal	from	
the	EU	variously	impacts	on	Britons	living	and	
working	elsewhere	in	the	EU.
By Michaela Benson
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Introduction
Immigration	was	central	to	the	EU	referendum.	In	
particular,	the	principle	of	freedom	of	movement,	
one	of	the	pillars	of	the	EU,	became	a	key	target	of	
the	Leave	campaign.	The	promise	to	curb	the	flow	
of	EU	nationals	into	Britain	proved	particularly	
effective	in	mobilising	Leave	voters.	Far	less	
attention	was	given	to	the	impact	of	Brexit	on	over	
three	million	EU	citizens	leaving	in	the	UK	and	one	
million	Britons	residing	in	the	EU.	The	issue	of	their	
legal	status	was	put	aside,	and	after	a	year	it	is	still	
unresolved.
Attempts	to	get	both	sides	to	pledge	support	for	
a	rapid	resolution	concerning	the	legal	status	of	
EU	nationals	living	in	Britain	received	cross	party	
support	before	the	referendum	but	evaporated	
soon	after.	To	date,	calls	for	a	unilateral	gesture	
of	good	will	from	the	prime	minister	towards	EU	
nationals	have	fallen	on	deaf	ears.	However,	there	
are	signs	that	the	political	landscape	emerging	
from	the	2017	general	election	may	force	the	
Government	to	soften	its	position.		
A year of uncertainty
A	year	of	uncertainty	over	their	right	to	remain	in	
Britain	is	taking	its	toll	on	EU	nationals,	with	some	
evidence	pointing	to	an	increase	in	mental	health	
and	anxiety	disorders	among	EU	residents.	A	
number	of	online	and	offline	discussion	fora	have	
emerged,	offering	legal	advice	and	mutual	support	
in	the	face	of	the	everyday	and	bureaucratic	
challenges	the	referendum	has	created	for	EU	
nationals,	especially	with	regard	to	securing	legal	
status	in	the	UK.	To	many	of	them,	the	referendum	
result,	and	the	realisation	that	their	position	
in	Britain	was	now	both	legally	precarious	and	
subject	to	the	fluctuation	of	party	politics,	came	as	
a	profound	shock.	
The	options	open	to	EU	nationals	vary	primarily	
according	to	the	length	of	their	stay	in	Britain.	
Many	long	term	residents	are	applying	for	
permanent	residence	and	British	citizenship.	
Others	are	contemplating	leaving	the	UK,	
especially	those	who,	because	of	their	age,	
working	status,	family	arrangements,	or	length	
of	stay,	feel	excluded	from	existing	pathways	to	
secure	their	status.	Others	may	be	doing	both,	
securing	their	legal	position	in	Britain,	while	
considering	options	elsewhere	in	Europe.	
According	to	the	Office	for	National	Statistics’	
latest	quarterly	release	of	provisional	long-term	
international	migration	estimates,	net	migration	
is	at	its	lowest	level	for	nearly	three	years.	The	
drop	is	partly	due	to	25,000	fewer	Poles	and	other	
Eastern	and	Central	Europeans	coming	to	work	in	
Britain,	and	an	increase	of	16,000	in	those	leaving.	
Uncertainty	over	their	future	legal	status	has	also	
triggered	a	rise	in	the	number	of	EU	nationals	and	
their	family	members	applying	to	the	Home	Office 
for	permanent	residence	–	five	times	higher	than	
last	year	–	and	British	citizenship,	which	is	up	35%	
in	the	past	year.	Detailed	Home	Office	data	on	
naturalisation	show	that	the	surge	in	citizenship	
applications	is	particularly	noticeable	among	
the	citizens	of	older	EU	member	states,	with	an	
increase	in	citizenships	applications	among	Italian,	
French,	and	German	nationals	in	the	most	recent	
period.	In	that	same	period,	some	of	the	largest	
number	of	applications,	however,	came	from	
Polish	nationals	who,	since	2010,	have	submitted	
applications	for	citizenship	in	large	numbers.
Forty years of EU membership
The	focus	during	the	referendum	on	recent	
arrivals,	particularly	from	Eastern	Europe,	has	
overshadowed	recent	and	past	immigration	from	
older	EU	member	states	and,	more	generally,	
the	fact	that	the	UK	has	been	a	member	of	the	
EU	for	40	years.	For	example,	while	the	inflow	
of	Central	and	Eastern	Europeans,	whose	levels	
of	immigration	have	been	relatively	high	since	
those	countries	entered	the	EU	in	2004	and	
2007	respectively,	has	received	extensive	media	
coverage,	far	less	coverage	was	accorded	to	the	
mobility	of	EU	nationals	from	Germany,	France,	
Spain	and	the	other	older	member	states.	These	
have	made	up	an	increasing	share	of	EU	migration	
to	the	UK	in	recent	years;	most	recent	estimates 
for	2016	show	that	53%	of	the	most	recent	
immigrants	estimates	from	the	EU	come	from	
EU14	countries	(member	states	joined	in	2000s).
Besides,	this	attention	on	latest	arrival	has	also	
obscured	an	inconvenient	truth.	Throughout	
four	decades	of	EU	membership,	there	has	been	
intermingling	of	people	which	can	be	most	clearly	
seen	in	the	growing	number	of	mixed-nationality	
EU	families	in	the	UK	and	their	offspring,	many	
of	whom	were	born	in	the	UK	and	hold	a	British	
passport.	Data	from	recent	birth	statistics	show	
that	almost	12%	of	children	born	in	England	and	
Wales	in	2015	had	at	least	one	EU-born	parent	
(the	figure	rose	from	8.1%	in	2009),	pointing	
to	their	potentially	increasing	demographic	
importance.	
This	is	a	growing	but	as	yet	understudied	and	
underreported	segment	of	British	society.	In	the	
post-EU	referendum	context,	in	which	the	rhetoric	
about	curbing	EU	immigration	has	permeated	
political,	media,	and	popular	discourses,	producing	
a	stark	“us	and	them”	narrative,	the	question	left	
unasked	and	unanswered	is	what	the	human	and	
emotional	costs	of	this	will	be	if,	for	a	large	section	
of	the	British	population,	“us	and	them”	are	the	
same.	
By Nando Sigona and Laurence Lessard-Phillips
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During	the	EU	referendum	campaign,	much	was	
made	of	the	UK	“taking	back	control”	of	law-
making	powers	from	Brussels,	and	the	issue	
certainly	resonated	with	many	voters.	Being	part	
of	the	EU	has	meant	that	a	lot	of	the	UK’s	laws	
originate	in	Brussels.	EU	law	making	involves	
EU-wide	standard-setting	in	areas	as	diverse	as	
banking	regulation,	agriculture,	the	environment,	
consumer	protection	and	employment	rights.	With	
the	UK’s	withdrawal	from	the	EU,	these	powers	
will	be	repatriated	to	the	UK.	How	much	flexibility	
the	UK	will,	in	fact,	have	to	set	its	own	laws	after	
this	remains	to	be	seen,	and	much	will	depend	on	
the	terms	of	our	existing	and	future	international	
agreements.	
But	there	is	another	aspect	of	this	repatriation	
of	powers	that	is	causing	constitutional	
headaches.	Brexit	may	mean	taking	back	
control	over	law	making	–	but	where	is	this	
control	being	taken	back	to?	The	UK	has	now	
experienced	nearly	20	years	of	devolution.	
Scotland,	Wales	and	Northern	Ireland	have	their	
own	governments	and	parliaments,	and	have	
primary	policy	responsibility	for	areas	including	
health,	education,	environmental	protection	
and	agricultural	policy.	Block	grants	from	the	
Treasury	to	the	devolved	administrations	have	
been	supplemented	by	important	EU	funding	
streams,	especially	significant	for	the	devolved	
nations’	agricultural	sectors,	as	well	as	for	their	
universities.	
means	to	finance	them.	Northern	Ireland,	Wales	
and	Scotland	should	then	be	recognised	as	being	
able	to	determine	their	own	policies	over	devolved	
areas,	including	fisheries,	agriculture,	and	the	
environment.	The	Supreme	Court	in	the	Article	
50	Miller case	agreed,	saying	that	“removal	of	EU	
constraints	on	withdrawal	from	the	EU	Treaties	
will	alter	the	competence	of	devolved	institutions	
unless	new	legislative	constraints	are	introduced.	
In	the	absence	of	such	new	restraints,	withdrawal	
from	the	EU	will	enhance	devolved	competence”.
But	for	the	UK	Government,	such	new	legislative	
constraints	are	required.	Powers	in	devolved	
policy	areas	will	not	flow	directly	to	the	devolved	
legislatures,	but	will	come	back	to	Westminster.	
As	a	first	step,	as	foreseen	in	the	Great	Repeal	Bill	
White	Paper,	the	legal	frameworks	set	at	an	EU	
level,	within	which	the	UK	and	its	devolved	nations	
currently	operate,	will	be	retained.	This	is	in	the	
interests	of	legal	certainty,	and	to	ensure	there	is	
legal	continuity	after	Brexit,	with	no	black	holes	
emerging.	Subsequently,	and	following	“intensive	
discussions”	with	the	devolved	nations,	further	
decisions	may	be	taken	on	determining	where	
UK-wide	approaches	are	needed,	and	where	
powers	may	lie	at	a	devolved	level,	including	the	
local	government	level.	It	is	expected	that	some	
common	frameworks	will	emerge	on	agriculture,	
environment,	fisheries	and	regional	policy	–	
areas	that	are	devolved,	but	which	have	been	
subject	to	EU	law.	The	UK	Government	argues	
that	this	approach	is	necessary	to	ensure	there	
is	no	disruption	to	the	UK’s	own	internal	market	
–	on	the	basis	that	divergences	in	law	create	
unnecessary	and	costly	obstacles	to	cross-UK	
trade.	Additionally,	it	is	said	to	be	needed	in	order	
for	the	Government	to	undertake	international	
trade	negotiations,	with	these	powers	falling	to	
London	to	exercise	for	the	UK	as	a	whole.	For	
the	devolved	nations,	however,	this	approach	is	
tantamount	to	a	power	grab	that	undermines	the	
existing	devolution	settlement	and	for	which	their	
support	is	certainly	not	guaranteed.	
What happens next?
What	that	means	in	constitutional	terms,	and	
its	significance	for	the	long-term	future	of	the	
UK,	remains	to	be	seen.	Pre-election,	the	Great	
Repeal	Bill	was	set	to	start	its	legislative	journey	
through	the	Houses	of	Parliament	before	the	
summer	recess.	Whilst	this	is	still	expected,	the	
Government’s	plans	for	the	devolved	nations	
may	come	up	against	opposition	there.	Yet	the	
opportunities	for	the	devolved	parliaments	and	
governments	to	feed	into	this	law-making	process	
are	very	limited,	despite	the	critical	significance	it	
will	have	for	them	and	their	powers.	This	reflects	
the	lack	of	experience	of	“shared”	rule	making	
amongst	the	different	levels	of	government	in	the	
UK.	Opposition	from	the	devolved	parliaments	
can	be	signalled	through	their	refusal	to	grant	
Legislative	Consent	Motions.	By	convention,	
these	are	required	when	Westminster	legislates	
on	devolved	matters	or	to	change	the	scope	of	
devolved	powers.	According	to	the	Supreme	
Court	in	the	Miller case,	however,	this	convention	
is	not	legally	enforceable,	operating	only	as	a	
political	constraint.	Any	resulting	constitutional	
clash	over	powers	may	provoke	further	moves	
towards	independence	in	Scotland.	In	Wales,	
the	Government	has	called	for	a	constitutional	
convention	and	a	redefinition	of	the	UK	machinery	
along	more	federal	lines,	creating	a	new	system	
for	making	common	policies.	In	any	case,	the	
UK	Government	will	be	going	into	the	Brexit	
negotiations	with	disunity	at	home,	which	may	
ultimately	prove	more	than	an	unwelcome	
distraction.	
By Jo Hunt
Whilst	the	UK	has	been	part	of	the	EU,	the	
powers	held	by	the	devolved	nations	have	
been	exercised	within	the	limits	of	EU	law.	They	
have	implemented	certain	EU	laws	themselves	
(resulting	in	some	difference	across	the	UK	in	
the	rules	on	eligibility	for	agricultural	payments,	
for	example),	as	well	as	ensuring	that	their	own	
policies	comply	with	the	demands	of	EU	law.	
So,	for	example,	Scotland’s	plans	for	minimum	
alcohol	pricing	ran	into	trouble	with	the	EU’s	
internal	market	laws,	constraining	the	Scottish	
Government’s	actions.	As	the	head	of	the	Scottish	
Vote	Leave	campaign	announced	ahead	of	the	
referendum,	Brexit	would	lift	these	restrictions	
and	lead	to	Scotland	gaining	“major	new	powers”.		
Devolution,	according	to	this	argument,	would	be	
enhanced	as	EU-derived	constraints	in	policy	areas	
devolved	under	the	Scotland	Act,	Government	of	
Wales	Act	and	the	Northern	Ireland	Act	fall	away.	
What has happened since the referendum?
How	much	salience	this	devolution	argument	
had	with	voters	in	the	referendum	is	unknown.	
However,	we	do	now	know	that	the	suggestion	
made	by	some	campaigners	that	Brexit	would	lead	
to	an	expansion	in	the	powers	of	the	devolved	
nations	is	proving	constitutionally	controversial.	
For	the	governments	of	the	devolved	nations,	
the	matter	though	is	straightforward.	The	current	
devolution	settlements	must	be	respected,	and	
powers	over	those	areas	which	are	devolved	
that	come	back	from	Brussels	must	go	to	Belfast,	
Cardiff	and	Edinburgh,	along	with	appropriate	
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Discussion	of	foreign	and	defence	policy	was	
largely	conducted	in	terms	of	generalities	during	
the	EU	referendum	campaign.	Key	themes	were	
the	EU’s	historic	role	in	bringing	peace	to	the	
European	continent,	and	claims	that	it	was	on	the	
road	to	creating	a	“European	army”.	
Remain	campaigners	argued	that	the	prosperity	
created	as	a	consequence	of	EU	membership	was	
integral	to	national	security.	Brexit,	they	argued,	
would	undermine	both	UK	and	EU	security	
and	stability.	These	claims	were	echoed	by	key	
international	figures,	including	President	Obama	
and	NATO	Secretary	General	Jens	Stoltenberg.
Brexit	campaigners,	in	contrast,	made	the	
argument	that	Brexit	would	provide	the	UK	with	
greater	freedom	to	fully	utilise	its	diplomatic,	
military	and	“soft	power”	capabilities,	and	hence	
achieve	enhanced	international	influence.	They	
also	sought	to	downplay	the	EU’s	contribution	to	
security,	insisting	that	NATO	and	the	United	States,	
not	the	EU,	have	kept	the	peace	in	Europe	since	
World	War	II.	These	campaigners	also	emphasised	
the	dangers	inherent	in	supposed	EU	moves	to	
create	a	“Euro	army”	in	place	of	national	armed	
forces.
The	Brussels	bombings	of	March	2016	gave	
different	security	issues	greater	prominence.	
It	focused	attention	on	the	issue	of	border	and	
“homeland”	security,	and	whether	the	UK’s	
security	is	enhanced,	or	compromised,	through	its	
membership	of	the	EU.	This	issue	gained	renewed	
attention	more	recently	following	the	terrorist	
attacks	at	Westminster,	Manchester	and	London	
Bridge.	
What has happened since the referendum?
The	future	of	the	EU-UK	foreign	and	security	
relationship	has	been	the	subject	of	relatively	
little	public	debate	since	the	referendum.	This	is	
partly	because	none	of	the	alternative	models	
for	a	future	trading	relationship	come	with	a	
predefined	model	for	foreign	and	security	policy	
cooperation.	In	addition,	foreign	policy,	and	
especially	security	policy,	are	areas	in	which	Mrs	
May’s	government	has	indicated	that	it	wants	to	
maintain	close	cooperation	with	the	EU.	The	Brexit	
White	Paper	and	speeches	by	the	prime	minister	
have	repeatedly	stressed	a	desire	for	a	close	EU-
UK	security	partnership.	
The	Government	has	also	promoted	the	idea	that	
Brexit	gives	the	UK	an	opportunity	to	reshape	its	
place	in	the	world.	“Global	Britain”,	a	slogan	first	
used	by	Prime	Minister	May	in	her	Conservative	
Party	conference	speech	in	October	2016,	is	
intended	to	signify	a	“reboot”	of	UK	foreign	policy	
–	actively	promoting	free	trade	and	cooperating	
closely	with	allies	to	build	a	safe	and	just	world.	
How	these	priorities	will	differ	from	existing	
commitments	is	still	unclear.	
Overseas	visits	and	major	international	summits	
since	the	referendum	offer	little	indication	
of	major	shifts	in	priorities	beyond	stressing	
the	importance	of	new	export	opportunities.	
Further,	the	election	of	President	Trump,	and	
the	UK	government’s	desire	to	seek	a	close	
relationship	with	his	administration,	have	attracted	
unfavourable	comparisons	with	the	more	critical	
stance	of	other	European	governments	(notably	
Chancellor	Merkel	and	President	Macron).	The	
UK	has	given	the	impression	of	downplaying	
President	Trump’s	ambiguous	stance	on	matters	of	
key	importance	to	the	UK,	such	as	the	stability	of	
NATO	and	global	free	trade.
What might happen?
The	relatively	underdeveloped	nature	of	the	EU’s	
foreign	and	security	policy	means	that	Brexit	will	
have	less	obvious	impacts	for	the	UK	than	in	other	
policy	areas.	The	UK	has	not	integrated	its	military	
capabilities	or	its	diplomatic	infrastructure	with	
the	EU	and,	consequently,	detachment	post-Brexit	
does	not	require	major	institutional	reform.
However,	the	UK	will	lose	its	participation	and	the	
capacity	to	directly	influence	EU	foreign	policy	
making	processes.	Further,	it	will	have	diminished	
influence	on	the	direction	of	development	of	the	
EU’s	nascent	defence	policy	as	a	non-member.	
The	referendum	has	already	had	a	direct	effect	on	
the	behaviour	of	the	EU’s	other	member	states.	
It	coincided	with	the	publication	of	the	new	EU	
Global	Strategy	(EUGS)	that	sets	out	how	the	EU	
intends	to	broaden	and	deepen	its	role	in	global	
politics.	One	aspect	of	the	EUGS	was	to	further	
develop	the	EU’s	role	in	the	security	and	defence	
fields.	UK	support	for	the	EUGS	was	predicated,	
in	part,	on	its	ambition	to	deepen	the	EU-NATO	
relationship	(subsequently	agreed	at	the	July	2016	
Warsaw	Summit).
As	indicative	of	the	diminished	influence	of	the	
UK	prior	to	completing	the	formalities	of	Brexit,	
some	member	states	have	already	made	proposals	
for	deepening	EU	defence	collaboration	in	a	
direction	that	the	UK	has	resisted.	The	French	
and	German	governments	have	jointly	proposed	
a	series	of	measures	that	include	a	permanent	
military	headquarters	for	EU	missions,	and	the	
creation	of	a	common	budget	for	military	research	
and	joint	procurement	to	be	run	through	the	
European	Defence	Agency	(an	institution	that	
the	UK	has	resisted	giving	a	substantive	budget	
or	a	major	role	in	defence	procurement).	Finally,	
they	have	advocated	reinforcing	existing	military	
formations,	such	as	the	EU’s	Battlegroups,	using	
EU	treaty	provisions	that	allow	for	smaller	groups	
of	member	states	to	undertake	deeper	defence	
collaboration.	
These	ideas	have	given	energy	to	the	ambitions	of	
the	EU	High	Representative	for	Foreign	Affairs	and	
Security	Policy	for	boosting	the	EU’s	capabilities.	
They	have	also	given	impetus	to	the	European	
Commission	to	earmark	part	of	the	EU	budget	for	
spending	on	defence	research	supported	by	all	
member	states.
Proposals	for	greater	EU	defence	integration	
have	largely	failed	in	the	last	two	decades,	partly	
because	these	have	been	resisted	by	the	UK.	
Brexit,	in	combination	with	a	US	administration	
that	appears	less	committed	to	European	security,	
has	given	impetus	to	EU	security	developments	
that	the	UK	is	now	in	less	of	a	position	to	
influence.	As	a	non-member,	the	UK	faces	the	
prospect	of	being	a	bystander	to	decisions	on	the	
future	of	European	defence	that	directly	impact	
on	the	UK’s	national	security	but	over	which	it	has	
minimal	influence.	
By Richard G Whitman
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Britain’s	relationship	with	the	EU	has	been	a	
fruitful	one	when	it	comes	to	higher	education.	By	
operating	within	a	larger	European	network,	UK	
universities	have	become	increasingly	competitive	
in	world	terms.	The	UK	attracts	the	second	
largest	number	of	international	students	and,	by	
most	counts,	has	the	second	strongest	research	
system	in	the	world	after	the	United	States.	The	
UK	accounts	for	3.2%	of	global	research	and	
development	expenditure	but	9.5%	of	scientific	
papers	downloaded,	11.6%	of	citations,	and	15.9%	
of	the	most	highly-cited	articles.	Shared	European	
ideas,	resources	and	talent	play	a	key	role	in	this	
remarkable	global	performance.	
The	UK’s	research	strength	rests	partly	on	its	
leading	role	in	EU	projects,	which	provide	access	
to	collaborators	across	the	continent.	From	2007	
to	2013,	the	UK	contributed	€5.4	billion	to	the	
EU	for	research,	development	and	innovation,	
while	receiving	€8.8	billion	in	research	grants.	Of	
this,	€6.9	billion	was	from	the	UK’s	Framework	
7	Programme,	in	which	UK	universities	were	the	
most	successful	recipients	with	a	71%	share	of	
projects.	
This	immersion	in	Europe	is	equally	striking	in	
relation	to	people	mobility.	In	2015-16,	127,440	
EU	students	enrolled	in	UK	higher	education,	
5.6%	of	all	students.	Non-UK	EU	countries	made	a	
larger	contribution	to	staffing.	In	2015-16,	31,635	
EU	staff	worked	at	higher	education	institutions	
in	the	UK,	16%	of	the	workforce.	The	figures	are	
higher	in	the	research-intensive	sector,	including	
37%	of	academic	staff	at	LSE	and	more	than	one	in	
four	in	Oxford,	Cambridge	and	University	College	
London.	In	the	last	half	decade,	more	than	40%	of	
new	academic	staff	appointed	on	merit	to	Russell	
Group	universities	were	from	the	EU.	
In	the	referendum	campaign,	the	argument	in	
relation	to	higher	education	was	straightforward.	
Universities	UK	and	other	sector	bodies,	and	
individual	Vice-Chancellors,	argued	vigorously	
for	Remain,	though	the	issue	never	achieved	
much	public	prominence	and	entered	the	official	
Remain	campaign	only	marginally,	in	relation	
to	research.	The	Leave	case	accepted	the	need	
for	the	UK	Government	to	compensate	science	
research	funding,	but	ignored	the	extent	to	which	
free	movement	within	the	EU	benefitted	higher	
education	and	research.	University	towns	voted	
strongly	for	Remain,	as	did	staff	and	students.
What has happened since the referendum
Only	one	of	the	issues	triggered	by	the	referendum	
has	been	resolved,	on	a	temporary	basis.	The	UK	
government	has	ruled	that	in	2017-18	EU	citizen	
students	can	enter	British	universities	on	the	same	
basis	as	UK	students,	as	before	the	referendum.	
EU	students	will	continue	to	pay	a	£9,000	per	
annum	fee	for	full-time	courses,	supported	by	
income	contingent	loans	payable	after	graduation.	
However,	the	position	for	students	entering	in	
2018-2019	is	unclear,	and	it	seems	almost	certain	
that	after	Brexit	EU	students	will	pay	fees	on	the	
same	basis	as	non-EU	international	students—that	
is,	they	will	pay	up-front	fees	in	the	year	of	study	
without	the	benefit	of	the	income	contingent	loans.	
Those	fees,	determined	by	the	universities,	will	
range	from	£12,000	per	year	to	£20,000	and	more.	
The	future	UK	residency	and	contribution	of	
all	non-UK	Europeans	has	been	fundamentally	
placed	in	doubt	by	the	referendum.	The	February	
2017	White	Paper	on	Brexit	indicated	that	the	
Government	wants	to	“secure	the	status	of	
EU	citizens	already	living	in	the	UK”	but	there	
has	been	no	resolution	of	this.	A	Times	Higher	
Education	poll	of	academics	in	March	2017	found	
that	53%	of	non-UK	nationals	were	“actively	
looking	to	leave	the	UK”	and	88%	said	that	
Brexit	has	made	them	more	likely	to	do	so	in	the	
medium-term	to	long-term.	This	is	a	crucial	issue,	
and	the	longer	it	is	unresolved	the	worse	will	be	
the	long-term	effects.	
The	Treasury	has	undertaken	to	compensate	
universities	for	any	early	loss	of	research	funding	
under	Horizon	2020	and	other	European	
schemes.	The	government	includes	continued	
UK	membership	of	European	research	schemes	
as	an	objective	in	Brexit	negotiations.	While	the	
importance	of	European	research	links	for	UK	
science	is	clearly	understood,	perhaps	more	so	
than	the	importance	of	retaining	EU	staff,	it	is	not	
generally	realised	that	the	two	areas	are	partly	
interdependent.	Further,	research	is	a	second	
order	public	issue	at	this	stage.
What might happen in the years to come?
A	hard	Brexit,	and	particularly	a	no	deal	outcome,	
constitute	serious	threats	to	the	national	viability	
and	global	competitiveness	of	UK	universities.	
Under	these	scenarios,	access	to	the	bulk	of	
European	research	funding	will	be	lost,	and	it	is	
highly	unlikely	that	UK	universities	and	science	
could	be	adequately	compensated	in	the	long	
run.	It	is	not	just	a	matter	of	money,	there	is	also	
the	lost	access	to	networks	of	shared	expertise.	
Any	reduction	in	the	national	science	base	also	
narrows	the	scope	for	industry	innovation.	
The	end	of	direct	EU	access	rights	will	trigger	a	
new	skilled	migration	scheme	in	UK,	with	incomers	
from	all	countries	handled	on	an	equivalent	basis.	
The	outcome	here	is	ambiguous.	A	scheme	that	
favoured	high	skill	researchers	and	educators	
could	maintain	much	of	the	present	entry	from	
Europe	while	enlarging	the	scope	for	entry	from	
other	parts	of	the	world.	However,	if	large	scale	
cuts	in	international	student	numbers	go	ahead	
as	planned,	this	would	narrow	the	flow	of	talent	
from	one	source	(international	student	graduates)	
while	discouraging	talent	from	another	(academic	
staff	from	Europe	and	elsewhere).	Much	in	higher	
education	depends	on	whether	in	the	fraught	
climate	of	Brexit	the	government	and	the	country	
can	maintain	the	UK,	especially	its	universities,	as	
meritocratic,	internationally	engaged,	and	above	
all,	open.		
By Simon Marginson
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Despite	the	UK’s	well-earned	reputation	as	an	
“awkward	partner”,	none	of	the	member	states	
wanted	to	see	it	leave	the	EU.	They	have	been	
perennially	puzzled	by	the	UK’s	domestic	debate	
about	“Europe”,	especially	given	London’s	
success	in	getting	its	way	in	successive	treaty	
negotiations,	as	well	as	in	day-to-day	policy	
making.	More	recently,	they	have	been	frustrated	
by	the	UK’s	lack	of	solidarity	over	the	eurozone	
and	migration	crises.	Still,	the	member	states	
recognised	the	value	of	the	UK’s	membership	
and	the	assets	it	brought	as	a	major	European	
economy,	with	strong	security	and	defence	
capabilities,	a	seat	on	the	UN	Security	Council,	
and	global	trading	links.	They	also	admired	the	
professionalism	with	which	the	UK	argued	its	case	
in	Brussels,	as	well	as	the	pragmatic	approach	it	
brought	to	the	table.	
Moreover,	for	some	member	states,	the	UK	was	
an	important	ally.	It	is	firmly	rooted	in	the	liberal	
economic	camp	alongside	Denmark,	Finland,	
Germany,	the	Netherlands,	Sweden,	and	the	
Baltic	states.	It	was	respected	by	the	countries	
of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	for	championing	
enlargement,	as	well	as	for	deciding	not	to	restrict	
migration	upon	their	accession	to	the	EU	in	2004.	
For	France,	the	UK	has	been	a	counterweight	to	
Germany;	for	Germany,	it	has	played	the	same	role	
in	relation	to	France.	The	UK’s	relationship	with	
Ireland	is	especially	intimate.	As	well	as	a	common	
border,	the	two	countries	share	close	historical,	
cultural	and	economic	ties.
For	these	reasons,	member	governments	
responded	positively,	if	warily,	to	Prime	Minister	
David	Cameron’s	demand	in	2015	for	a	new	
bargain	for	Britain,	even	if	the	UK	took	time	to	
specify	what	it	wanted.	Yet,	although	they	were	
willing	to	do	a	deal	to	keep	the	UK	inside	the	EU,	
they	were	not	prepared	to	compromise	the	EU’s	
fundamental	principles,	especially	the	freedom	of	
movement	of	workers.
Post-referendum
The	results	of	the	EU	referendum	were	greeted	
with	disappointment	across	the	national	capitals	
of	the	EU.	“We	regret	this	decision	but	respect	it”,	
said	President	Tusk,	President	Juncker,	President	
Schulz	and	the	Netherlands	Prime	Minister	
Rutte	in	their	joint	statement	the	day	after	the	
referendum.	At	the	same	time,	agitated	by	the	
UK’s	repeated	claim	that	“they	depend	more	on	
us	than	we	do	on	them”,	national	leaders	have	
cautioned	that,	although	Brexit	will	hurt	the	EU,	
the	UK	will	suffer	even	greater	harm.
The	EU27	were	quick	to	adopt	a	common	position.	
As	well	as	calling	on	the	UK	Government	to	notify	
the	European	Council	of	its	intention	to	withdraw	
from	the	EU	as	quickly	as	possible,	the	leaders	of	
the	EU27	underlined	their	commitment	to	the	EU	
and	agreed	three	principles	for	the	conduct	of	the	
Brexit	negotiations:	
•	 that	negotiations	should	not	begin	with	the	UK	
until	after	London	had	triggered	Article	50;
•	 that	the	UK	would	need	to	accept	obligations,	
notably	concerning	EU	citizens	resident	in	the	
UK,	as	well	as	rights	vis-à-vis	the	EU;
•	 that	the	UK	could	not	expect	access	to	Europe’s	
Single	Market	unless	it	accepted	the	four	
freedoms	of	movement	of	goods,	capital,	
services	and	workers.
Subsequently,	the	EU27	have	maintained	their	
collective	position.	Although	prepared	to	commit	
themselves	to	a	constructive	bilateral	relationship	
in	the	post-Brexit	era,	they	have	refused	to	enter	
any	discussions	that	might	pre-empt	the	Article	50	
negotiations,	particularly	regarding	future	trade	
relations.	At	the	same	time,	they	have	emphasised	
that,	while	the	aim	is	not	to	punish	the	UK,	the	
negotiations	will	be	hard,	and	the	UK	cannot	
expect	to	retain	the	advantages	conferred	by	EU	
membership.	
Any	hope	in	other	EU	capitals	that	the	UK	would	
change	its	mind	about	Brexit	quickly	receded.	
Indeed,	the	tone	of	UK	rhetoric	–	notably	in	
the	speeches	made	by	Theresa	May	and	Home	
Secretary	Amber	Rudd	at	the	2016	Conservative	
Party	conference,	which	appeared	to	threaten	the	
rights	of	EU	citizens	in	the	UK,	Michael	Howard’s	
comments	about	going	to	war	to	defend	Gibraltar,	
as	well	as	Foreign	Secretary	Boris	Johnson’s	
repeated	references	to	World	War	II	and	the	Nazi	
regime,	to	cite	but	a	few	–	provoked	dismay	and	
bewilderment	among	the	UK’s	partners.	
Moreover,	alarm	about	London’s	expectations	
(“having	our	cake	and	eating	it”),	its	threat	to	walk	
away	from	negotiations	(“no	deal	is	better	than	
a	bad	deal”),	and	the	unwillingness	of	the	prime	
minister	to	outline	the	UK’s	objectives,	has	led	to	
voluble	criticism	that	is	unusual	among	allies.	Most	
notably,	in	the	wake	of	European	Commission	
President	Juncker’s	infamous	dinner	at	Number	10,	
Chancellor	Merkel	warned	the	UK	about	harbouring	
“illusions”	about	the	outcome	it	would	achieve	from	
the	negotiations.	In	addition,	Ireland,	which	will	be	
more	affected	than	any	member	state	by	Brexit,	
fears	its	concerns	have	not	been	taken	seriously	
in	London,	and	has	sought	to	ensure	that	its	
circumstances	are	understood	in	other	EU	capitals.
One year on
Since	June	2016,	the	sentiment	in	the	capitals	of	the	
EU27	has	moved	from	disappointment	and	disbelief	
to	impatience.	While	there	is	still	regret	about	the	
outcome	of	the	referendum,	as	well	as	a	hope	that	
the	UK	will	one	day	return,	member	governments	
are	irritated	about	the	length	of	time	it	took	London	
first	to	trigger	Article	50	and	then	to	commence	
negotiations.	The	UK’s	partners	have	also	been	
unimpressed	by	UK	diplomacy	since	23	June	2016.
On	the	eve	of	negotiations,	the	UK’s	objectives	
remain	largely	unknown.	There	is	concern	that	
London	entertains	unrealistic	expectations,	and	
anxiety	that	the	UK	will	stage	a	walk	out.	To	make	
matters	worse,	a	snap	election	that	was	called	
to	deliver	a	stronger	personal	mandate	for	the	
prime	minister	has	delivered	a	hung	parliament,	
introducing	still	further	uncertainty	and	diminishing	
the	prospects	of	a	conclusion	of	business	within	
the	two	years	foreseen	by	Article	50.	
Having	committed	themselves	to	a	future	within	
the	EU,	the	UK’s	EU	partners	have	held	firm,	
resisting	all	attempts	by	London	to	“divide	and	
conquer”.	From	the	Netherlands	Prime	Minister	
Mark	Rutte	to	French	President	Emmanuel	
Macron,	Europe’s	leaders	have	underlined	that,	
while	they	are	disappointed	at	the	UK’s	decision,	
they	respect	it.	However,	they	also	warn	that	the	
forthcoming	negotiations	will	be	tough.
By Hussein Kassim
TWENTY-SEVEN
5958
PART SIX: BREXIT AND THE EU
Introduction
The	EU	depends	on	its	member	states	for	its	
legal,	financial	and	political	existence	and	so	is	
usually	willing	to	try	to	accommodate	their	“local	
difficulties”.	In	the	UK’s	case,	this	meant	Jean-
Claude	Juncker	(President	of	the	Commission)	and	
especially	Donald	Tusk	(President	of	the	European	
Council)	trying	to	find	an	accommodation	in	
the	renegotiation	that	would	allow	Cameron	
to	take	back	something	valuable	in	the	coming	
referendum	campaign,	but	also	respecting	the	
interests	of	other	members.
From	the	EU	perspective,	the	resultant	“new	
settlement”	was	a	sincere	effort	to	give	Cameron	
a	leg-up,	albeit	one	pointedly	draped	in	language	
that	reminded	everyone	that	the	treaties	already	
allowed	for	much	more	flexibility	than	public	
debate	seemed	to	suppose.	However,	the	
overblown	rhetoric	that	Cameron	had	taken	into	
the	renegotiation	meant	that	any	advantage	he	
might	have	gained	was	lost	in	the	howls	of	the	
British	press	about	being	short-changed.
Unsurprising	as	this	was,	it	confirmed	the	dominant	
view	in	Brussels	that	the	best	subsequent	course	
of	action	was	to	maintain	a	very	low	profile,	as	any	
intervention	in	the	referendum	was	likely	to	back-
fire.	Either	the	vote	would	be	won	–	in	which	case	
the	new	settlement	would	come	into	effect	and	
normal	service	would	resume,		or	lost	–	in	which	
case	contingency	plans	would	kick	in.
Post referendum
The	outline	of	these	plans	was	always	clear	before	
the	referendum	itself,	but	was	expanded	upon	
very	quickly	afterwards,	notably	in	the	statements	
on	24	and	28	June	from	EU	leaders.
In	essence,	the	EU’s	position	was,	and	continues	to	
be,	that	if	the	UK	wants	to	leave	the	organisation,	
then	it	should	do	so,	following	the	procedure	
established	for	just	such	an	eventuality:	the	
infamous	Article	50.	
While	it	is	simple	to	state	the	Union’s	view,	it	
carries	with	it	a	number	of	key	consequences.
First,	it	fits	with	the	EU’s	tradition	of	trying	to	
balance	local	needs	with	common	interests.	If	the	
renegotiation	was	not	enough	to	convince	the	
British	public,	then	their	views	must	be	respected.	
However,	this	implies	respecting	the	views	of	
other	member	states	that	were	not	willing	to	offer	
further	concessions	to	the	UK:	hence,	no	post-
referendum	renegotiations.
Second,	and	linked	to	this,	the	UK	will	not	get	
special	treatment.	The	renegotiation	text	itself	
applied	to	all	member	states,	with	the	sole	
exception	for	the	UK	being	a	confirmation	that	
it	already	met	the	threshold	to	limit	benefits.	
Likewise,	the	EU	has	a	process	for	departure,	and	
a	process	for	establishing	third-country	relations,	
both	of	which	will	be	used	to	establish	a	new	
relationship	with	the	UK.
Thirdly,	the	insistence	on	Article	50	places	the	EU	
in	a	strong	negotiating	position.	The	dynamic	of	
the	negotiations	will	be	one	of	the	EU	making	an	
offer	to	the	UK,	rather	than	vice	versa.	We	have	
already	seen	this	with	the	publication	of	detailed	
EU	negotiating	guidelines.	While	the	EU	is	free	to	
make	whatever	offer	it	wishes	to	the	UK,	the	UK	
will	be	limited	to	working	around	that	agenda,	
responding	rather	than	defining.
This	imbalance	of	power	partly	explains	the	
long	delay	between	the	referendum	and	the	
notification	that	the	UK	wanted	to	trigger	Article	
50.	As	long	as	the	British	Government	did	not	
trigger	the	procedure,	there	was	no	time	pressure,	
and	an	opportunity	to	try	and	influence	the	
content	and	direction	of	negotiations.	However,	
in	the	absence	of	any	coherent	British	policy	on	
how	to	approach	the	negotiations,	and	in	the	face	
of	evident	determination	on	the	part	of	the	EU	
institutions	to	avoid	any	pre-notification	talks,	this	
opportunity	ultimately	came	to	nothing.
One year on
As	the	UK	begins	substantive	negotiations,	it	faces	
an	EU	with	a	very	well-developed	organisational	
structure	and	a	negotiating	position	that	enjoys	a	
high	level	of	buy-in	from	all	sides.
Importantly,	any	potential	for	conflict	between	
the	European	Council,	Commission	and	European	
Parliament	was	addressed	early	on.	European	
Council	President	Donald	Tusk	quickly	took	the	
lead	as	the	main	contact	point	at	the	level	of	heads	
of	government,	while	the	Commission	built	a	
dedicated	negotiating	team	around	Michel	Barnier.	
Meanwhile,	the	European	Parliament	was	able	
to	influence	the	formulation	of	the	negotiating	
mandates.	Its	role	under	its	“lead	negotiator”	Guy	
Verhofstadt	might	be	best	thought	of	as	that	of	
a	(not	very)	bad	cop	alongside	the	Commission,	
promising	to	veto	any	agreement	that	does	not	
secure	citizens’	rights.	Close	coordination	between	
the	EU	institutions	will	also	limit	the	UK’s	ability	to	
play	them	off	against	each	other,	something	that	
might	potentially	have	complicated	ratification	of	
the deal.
The	unity	of	the	institutions	will	be	severely	
tested	in	the	rest	of	2017,	as	one	of	the	main	
principles	of	the	mandate	is	challenged	by	the	
UK,	namely	sequencing.	While	the	mandate	does	
have	some	flexibility,	it	essentially	assumes	that	
liabilities	of	membership	–	including	finances	–	
must	be	resolved	before	any	discussion	of	the	
new	relationship.	Given	the	politically	toxic	nature	
of	the	money	question	for	the	UK	Government,	
it	is	understandable	that	it	would	prefer	to	
bundle	everything	up	together,	if	only	to	distract	
attention.	As	ever,	the	EU	is	sympathetic	to	this	–	
hence	its	clear	focus	on	principles	for	calculating	
liabilities,	rather	than	using	actual	figures	–	but	
its	need	to	cover	the	gaps	in	financing	for	other	
member	states	suggest	that	it	will	stand	its	ground	
on	this	issue.
Whether	the	EU	institutions	will	be	willing	or	able	
to	maintain	their	positions	through	to	the	end	of	
Article	50	remains	to	be	seen;	given	developments	
to	date,	it	looks	much	more	likely	that	it	will	be	
the	UK	that	has	to	cleave	to	the	EU,	rather	than	
the	other	way	around.	Indeed,	the	unity	of	the	
EU	has	an	intrinsic	value	as	a	symbol	of	European	
cooperation	that	will	make	it	that	much	harder	to	
compromise	or	shift	its	position.
By Simon Usherwood
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